Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
Published: 2026-08-31
Score: 2.3 Low
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

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Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Mon, 31 Aug 2026 03:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
Title AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle
First Time appeared Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin
Weaknesses CWE-639
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Ash-project Ash Admin
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-31T02:31:29.547Z

Reserved: 2026-08-30T23:15:02.371Z

Link: CVE-2026-81853

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-31T03:16:42.670

Modified: 2026-08-31T03:16:42.670

Link: CVE-2026-81853

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-31T08:00:11Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-639

    Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key