Description
Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.
Published: 2026-08-27
Score: 8.8 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

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Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Thu, 27 Aug 2026 18:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.
Title Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via EmailCollector Attachment Filename
First Time appeared Dolibarr
Dolibarr dolibarr Erp\/crm
Weaknesses CWE-22
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:dolibarr:dolibarr_erp\/crm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Dolibarr
Dolibarr dolibarr Erp\/crm
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Subscriptions

Dolibarr Dolibarr Erp\/crm
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-27T20:07:34.881Z

Reserved: 2026-08-27T11:15:29.421Z

Link: CVE-2026-81730

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-27T20:18:55.480

Modified: 2026-08-27T20:18:55.480

Link: CVE-2026-81730

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses
  • CWE-22

    Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')