Description
Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.
Published:
2026-09-02
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
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Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Wed, 02 Sep 2026 19:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking. | |
| Title | Prevent DoS on deadlocked established channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh | |
| References |
|
Subscriptions
No data.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Go
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-02T19:37:05.807Z
Reserved: 2026-06-23T15:10:49.353Z
Link: CVE-2026-56855
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-02T20:17:36.397
Modified: 2026-09-02T20:17:36.397
Link: CVE-2026-56855
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.