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Tracking
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Thu, 20 Aug 2026 22:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0. | |
| Title | TREK: Blind SSRF via unvalidated redirect-following in Google/Naver list import and Maps URL resolution | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-20T21:46:51.288Z
Reserved: 2026-06-15T18:01:15.512Z
Link: CVE-2026-54508
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-20T22:17:21.410
Modified: 2026-08-20T22:17:21.410
Link: CVE-2026-54508
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OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
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CWE-918
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)