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Search Results (372489 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-18193 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-19 | 8.9 High |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to bypass security restrictions due to improper validation of user-controlled addresses. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74463 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: jz4780: Cache host clock rate at probe to prevent CCF prepare_lock deadlock Fix a severe AB/BA deadlock between the Common Clock Framework (CCF) and the I2C adapter lock, which triggers when an I2C-controlled clock generator client (like the Si5351) is registered or modified under the CCF. During an i2c client clock (generator) frequency change, the CCF acquires its global 'prepare_lock' mutex and the driver calls i2c_transfer() to update the client's chip registers, stalling for the adapter's I2C bus lock. Concurrently, an independent, parallel transfer on the same bus (e.g., a GPIO expander handling LEDs) can hold the I2C adapter lock. Inside this parallel transfer path, jz4780_i2c_set_speed() calls clk_get_rate() on the host controller's input clock to calculate bus timings. This call attempts to acquire the blocked CCF 'prepare_lock', creating a circular dependency that freezes the system. The jz4780 host controller clock itself is static and never changes at runtime. However, calling clk_get_rate() inside the active transfer path introduces an unnecessary dependency on the CCF internal locks. Eliminate this synchronous clk_get_rate() call from the active transfer path by caching the static host peripheral clock rate once - inside the private jz4780_i2c structure during jz4780_i2c_probe(). Update jz4780_i2c_set_speed() to use this cached value, safely decoupling active I2C transactions from the CCF internal locks without any risk of stale timings. Assisted-by web based Google AI (pinpointing the bug and writing the message). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74459 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: etas_es58x: es58x_read_bulk_callback(): fix RX buffer leak on URB resubmit failure es58x_read_bulk_callback() resubmits the RX URB after processing a received packet. If the resubmit succeeds, the URB remains anchored and will be handled by the normal RX path or by teardown. However, if usb_submit_urb() fails, the callback unanchors the URB and then returns directly. This skips the existing free_urb path, so the coherent transfer buffer allocated with usb_alloc_coherent() is not released. Reuse the existing free_urb path after a resubmit failure so that the RX coherent buffer is freed before leaving the callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-17476 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-19 | 4.8 Medium |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an improper buffer write. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74457 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index The channel control index ctrl_idx is derived from rx->len which comes directly from a device USB payload. The mask 0x0f allows values 0-15, but the array size of usb_if->dev[] is only 2. Values 2-15 cause heap out-of-bounds read, eventually causing kernel panic in the IRQ context. Add bounds checking for ctrl_idx before the array access in both pcan_usb_pro_handle_canmsg() and pcan_usb_pro_handle_error(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74456 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc() and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also frees the transfer buffer. If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set, usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double free of the transfer buffer. BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0 Free of addr ffff8881069ccb80 by task trigger.sh/285 Call Trace: kfree+0x113/0x3c0 usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0 Drop the redundant kfree(buf); usb_free_urb() already releases the transfer buffer. This mirrors commit 03819abbeb11 ("net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free issue with interrupt buffer allocation"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74454 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Supply the overflow slot size in BPOS, not the whole bin BO size vc4_overflow_mem_work() points BPOA at a 512KB slot inside the 16MB binner BO, but writes the size of the whole BO to BPOS. On every binner out-of-memory event the PTB is therefore authorized to write tile lists across all the other slots (which may hold the tile state, tile alloc and overflow memory of in-flight jobs) and, for any slot but the first, past the end of the binner BO into unrelated CMA memory. Since CMA pages are recycled into page cache and user allocations, this is arbitrary memory corruption by GPU DMA. In practice it shows up as GPU hangs with corrupted control list pointers, userspace heap corruption, a GPU that stays permanently wedged after the first hang, and occasional full system crashes, whenever a job overflows the initial binner slot. The bug dates back to the conversion from a dedicated overflow BO (where writing the full BO size was correct) to the slotted binner BO. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74446 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: hold event_mutex while checkpointing CRIU events kfd_criu_checkpoint_events() counts the entries in p->event_idr via kfd_get_num_events(), allocates an array sized to that count, and then walks the same IDR to fill it. Neither the count nor the walk holds p->event_mutex. The CRIU checkpoint caller holds only p->mutex. Event create and destroy (kfd_event_create()/kfd_event_destroy()) take p->event_mutex and do not take p->mutex, so a second thread in the same process can insert or remove events between the count and the walk. If an event is inserted, the walk iterates more entries than were counted and writes past the end of the ev_privs allocation; if an event is removed, the walk dereferences an entry that is being freed. Hold p->event_mutex across the count and the walk so both observe a consistent view of p->event_idr. The lock is released before copy_to_user(), which only touches the local buffer. The caller already holds p->mutex and the create/destroy paths never take p->mutex, so the p->mutex -> p->event_mutex order is not inverted and no deadlock is introduced. (cherry picked from commit ff57e223ab105795b05d3ef3f3c35a5a441bcbaa) | ||||
| CVE-2026-74444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division vmw_cmd_draw() computes maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum. Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory. Reject undersized headers up front. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74443 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: bound DMA command body size against suffix pointer vmw_cmd_dma() locates the DMA suffix at (unsigned long) &cmd->body + header->size - sizeof(*suffix) without checking that header->size is large enough to contain both cmd->body and the suffix. An undersized header makes the suffix pointer underflow back into the previous command in the bounce buffer. The verifier later writes suffix->maximumOffset, clobbering verified fields of an already-relocated earlier command -- a TOCTOU on the device-visible command stream that lets one command rewrite another's GMR id, surface id, or other authenticated fields. Reject the command if the body is too small for the suffix to fit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18101 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a local attacker to gain elevated privileges due to improper management of thread authority swaps. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72237 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g. $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \ perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' ... 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//- ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72181 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw. When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer. Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing copy_from_user() to clobber the mask pointer. Furthermore, the old logic performed copy_from_user() before allocating the mask. Fix this by allocating new_mask first. To handle variable-sized user masks correctly, use cpumask_size() to truncate overly large user masks or pad undersized masks with zeros before copying the data directly into the allocated buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72146 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: sh: rz-dmac: Move interrupt request after everything is set up Once the interrupt is requested, the interrupt handler may run immediately. Since the IRQ handler can access channel->ch_base, which is initialized only after requesting the IRQ, this may lead to invalid memory access. Likewise, the IRQ thread may access uninitialized data (the ld_free, ld_queue, and ld_active lists), which may also lead to issues. Request the interrupts only after everything is set up. To keep the error path simpler, use dmam_alloc_coherent() instead of dma_alloc_coherent(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-18086 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-08-19 | 4.5 Medium |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service due to improper bounds checking. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72125 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER isotp_release() looked up the bound network device via dev_get_by_index() using the stored ifindex. During device unregistration the device is unlisted from the ifindex hash before the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier chain runs, so a concurrent isotp_release() could find no device, skip can_rx_unregister() entirely, and still proceed to free the socket. Since isotp_release() had already removed itself from the isotp notifier list at that point, isotp_notify() would never get a chance to clean up either, leaving a stale CAN filter that keeps pointing at the freed socket. Fix this the same way raw.c already does: hold a tracked reference to the bound net_device in the socket (so->dev/so->dev_tracker) from bind() onward instead of re-resolving it from the ifindex, and serialize bind()/release() with rtnl_lock() so that so->dev is always consistent with what the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier sees. so->dev stays valid regardless of ifindex-hash unlisting, and is only ever cleared by whichever of isotp_release()/isotp_notify() gets there first, so the filter is always removed exactly once. isotp_bind() now rejects a (re)bind with -EAGAIN while so->[tx|rx].state isn't ISOTP_IDLE yet, so a timer left running by a prior NETDEV_UNREGISTER can't act on a newly bound so->ifindex. Both checks share the same lock_sock() section, so there is no window in which a concurrent isotp_notify() clearing so->bound could be missed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock The TX state machine (so->tx.state) is driven from three contexts: sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so->rx_lock elsewhere left windows where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer. so->rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg() takes it to check so->tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to ISOTP_SENDING, bump so->tx_gen and drain the previous transfer's timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf() already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim. This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()'s cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel timers and reset the state unconditionally. isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg() sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending. Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so->rx_lock, since they run under so->rx_lock's cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves would deadlock. so->tx_gen lets them recognize whether the transfer they timed out is still the one currently active, so they don't report an error against a transfer that has since completed or been superseded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72123 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Commit f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()") replaced synchronize_rcu() in bcm_delete_rx_op() with call_rcu() and introduced the RX_NO_AUTOTIMER flag. However, this flag check was omitted for thrtimer in the packet rx fast-path. During BCM RX operation teardown, a concurrent RCU reader (bcm_rx_handler) can race and re-arm thrtimer via bcm_rx_update_and_send() after call_rcu() has been scheduled. Once the RCU grace period elapses, bcm_op is freed. The subsequently firing thrtimer then dereferences the deallocated op, causing a UAF. Adding flag checks to the rx fast-path (bcm_rx_update_and_send) does not fully close the TOCTOU race and introduces latency for every CAN frame. Conversely, calling hrtimer_cancel() directly inside the RCU callback (softirq context) is fatal as hrtimer_cancel() can sleep, triggering a "scheduling while atomic" panic. Resolve this by deferring the timer cancellation and memory free to a dedicated unbound workqueue (bcm_wq). The RCU callback now queues a work item to bcm_wq, which safely cancels both timers and deallocates memory in sleepable process context. A dedicated workqueue is used to prevent system-wide WQ saturation and is cleanly flushed/destroyed on module unload to avoid rmmod page faults. Since the deferred work can now outlive the calling context by an unbounded amount, also take a reference on op->sk when it is assigned and drop it only once the deferred work has cancelled both timers, so a socket can no longer be freed out from under a still-armed timer whose callback (bcm_send_to_user()) dereferences op->sk. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72121 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic. Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock. hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller. Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame's can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op->frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent. bcm_rx_handler()'s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snapshot of op->flags before deciding whether to call bcm_can_tx(), but does not hold the lock across that call. Also take a lock-protected snapshot of the currframe in bcm_can_tx() to avoid partly overwrites by content updates in bcm_tx_setup(). Finally check if a TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX/SETTIMER might have reset op->currframe between the two locked sections in bcm_can_tx(). Omit calling hrtimer_forward() with zero interval in bcm_rx_thr_handler(). kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() before it cancels this timer, so check kt_ival2 inside the bcm_rx_update_lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72119 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Stage new CAN frame content for an existing tx op into a kmalloc()'d buffer and validate it there, mirroring the approach already used in bcm_rx_setup(). Only copy the validated data into op->frames while holding op->bcm_tx_lock, so bcm_can_tx() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler() can no longer observe a partially updated or unvalidated frame. Add a missing error path for memcpy_from_msg() when copying CAN frame data from userspace. Also move the kt_ival1/kt_ival2/ival1/ival2 updates in bcm_tx_setup() under op->bcm_tx_lock, and read kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under the same lock in bcm_tx_set_expiry() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler(), closing the torn 64-bit ktime_t read on 32-bit platforms. | ||||