| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igbvf: Fix leak in TX DMA error cleanup
If an error is encountered while mapping TX buffers, the driver should
unmap any buffers already mapped for that skb.
Because count is incremented before each frag mapping, it will always
match the correct number of unmappings needed when dma_error is reached.
Decrementing count before the while loop in dma_error causes an
off-by-one error. If any mapping was successful before an unsuccessful
mapping, exactly one DMA mapping (the head) would leak.
This bug was introduced by a 2010 fix for an endless loop in dma_error.
All other affected drivers have already been fixed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix socket use-after-free during link group termination
__smc_lgr_terminate() drops conns_lock after finding a connection in
lgr->conns_all, but before taking a reference on its socket. The connection
is embedded in the socket, and its registration reference protects it only
while the connection remains in the tree.
A concurrent close can unregister the connection and drop that reference,
freeing the socket before the termination worker reaches sock_hold().
The race is reachable when close overlaps link group termination.
Local stress testing reproduced the use-after-free and KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
Write of size 4 by task kworker/3:3
Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc]
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
The socket was allocated by smc_create(), freed through
slab_free_after_rcu_debug(), and was followed by:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc]
Take the socket reference while conns_lock still protects the tree entry.
The unregister path then cannot drop the last reference until termination
has finished using the socket. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: use the subframe length when parsing A-MSDU TDLS frames
mwifiex_11n_dispatch_amsdu_pkt() splits an A-MSDU with
ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() and walks the resulting subframes. For each
subframe it passes the subframe data pointer to
mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(), but pairs it with skb->len, the
length of the A-MSDU parent, instead of rx_skb->len:
rx_skb = __skb_dequeue(&list);
rx_hdr = (struct rx_packet_hdr *)rx_skb->data;
if (ISSUPP_TDLS_ENABLED(priv->adapter->fw_cap_info) &&
ntohs(rx_hdr->eth803_hdr.h_proto) == ETH_P_TDLS) {
mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(priv, (u8 *)rx_hdr,
skb->len);
}
The parent is not a valid description of that buffer, and may not be
valid memory at all. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() ends with
if (!reuse_skb)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
and it only sets reuse_skb when the parent is linear, is not a
head_frag, and is being consumed as the *last* subframe. So when the
parent does not qualify for reuse it has already been freed, and the
read of skb->len is a use-after-free. When it is reused, skb->len is
the length of the last subframe, applied to every earlier subframe,
which over-states the buffer whenever an earlier subframe is shorter.
The callee cannot absorb a wrong length, because it derives its own
ceiling from the value it is given. Each frame type computes
ies_len = len - sizeof(struct ethhdr) - TDLS_*_FIX_LEN;
and the element walk is then bounded entirely against that ceiling,
for (end = pos + ies_len; pos + 1 < end; pos += 2 + pos[1]) {
u8 ie_len = pos[1];
if (pos + 2 + ie_len > end)
break;
so a too-large len moves end past the end of the subframe and the walk
reads and copies beyond it. The A-MSDU layout is chosen by the sender,
which makes the difference between the last subframe and a shorter
earlier one remotely selectable. Reaching this requires TDLS support in
firmware and the TDLS ethertype on the subframe.
The other caller, mwifiex_process_rx_packet(), is correct: it passes a
pointer and a length that describe the same region of the RX buffer.
Pass rx_skb->len, the length of the subframe actually being parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter
The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that
separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate
even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that
same delimiter:
memset(buf + count, del, 8);
Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and
happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of
scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag
characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is
none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.
If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts
as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps
reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is
not a flag character. For example registering
PaPEPPxPPiP
with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x",
interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end
of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the
parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of
bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the
scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a
slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to
unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without
privileges.
Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a
registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds
read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: unlock i_mmap_rwsem before releasing after-split folios
__folio_split() keeps dereferencing the mapping after the split:
shmem_uncharge(mapping->host) and remap_page() while the folios are still
frozen/locked, and i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping) at the very end, after the
after-split folios have been unlocked and freed.
Nothing holds an inode reference across that. The split relies on @folio
-- which the beyond-EOF drop loop never removes, as it starts at
folio_next(folio) -- staying locked and in the page cache to hold off
eviction. But the unlock loop unlocks @folio before i_mmap_unlock_read()
runs. If the caller's @lock_at is a tail beyond EOF, as memory_failure()
passes when splitting a poisoned tail of a shmem THP that reaches past
i_size during truncation, it too is gone from the page cache; so once
@folio is unlocked no locked, in-cache folio pins the inode, and a
concurrent final iput() can evict and RCU-free it before
i_mmap_unlock_read() touches i_mmap_rwsem:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __up_read+0x634/0x790
i_mmap_unlock_read include/linux/fs.h:537 [inline]
__folio_split+0x732/0x1640 mm/huge_memory.c:4100
try_to_split_thp_page+0xab/0x390 mm/memory-failure.c:1675
memory_failure+0x1394/0x26e0 mm/memory-failure.c:2470
Freed by task 4601:
shmem_free_in_core_inode+0x54/0xb0 mm/shmem.c:5177
evict+0x57f/0xac0 fs/inode.c:870
Do every mapping dereference while @folio still pins the inode: drop
i_mmap_rwsem right after remap_page(), before the loop that unlocks and
frees the after-split folios, and clear @mapping so the exit path does not
unlock it again. shmem_uncharge() and remap_page() already run before
that point, so after this nothing past the unlock loop touches the inode
or the mapping.
This is now a rule the split depends on, alongside keeping @folio frozen
until the page cache is updated: no inode or mapping dereference once the
after-split folios start being unlocked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_reporting: use system_freezable_wq to fix UAF during suspend
During PM freeze (e.g. S3 suspend or S4 hibernation), device drivers like
virtio_balloon reset their underlying virtio devices and delete their
virtqueues via vdev->config->del_vqs().
However, page reporting work (page_reporting_process) was scheduled on the
global system_wq. Because system_wq lacks the WQ_FREEZABLE flag, the PM
freezer skips it, leaving page_reporting_process active during suspend.
If pages are freed into the buddy allocator while suspending (for example,
when core MM invokes the balloon shrinker during S4 hibernation image
saving), page reporting triggers virtballoon_free_page_report() on deleted
virtqueues, resulting in a Use-After-Free / General Protection Fault:
[ 196.795226] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xaa1436fe70dae6df: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 196.825967] Workqueue: events page_reporting_process
[ 196.831038] RIP: 0010:virtqueue_add_split+0x233/0x4c0 [virtio_ring]
[ 196.927073] virtballoon_free_page_report+0x3a/0xe0 [virtio_balloon]
[ 196.946943] page_reporting_process+0x370/0x4f0
Fix this by switching page reporting work to system_freezable_wq. This
ensures that the PM freezer pauses page_reporting_process before device
drivers destroy their reporting virtqueues. Because the reporting worker
is frozen, memory reclamation/freeing (e.g. via shrinker execution) can
safely return pages to MM during freeze without triggering unfrozen
reporting work on deleted virtqueues.
This aligns with the driver's existing design. The comment in
virtballoon_freeze() states:
/*
* The workqueue is already frozen by the PM core before this
* function is called.
*/
Testing:
I have verified these fixes using Google’s virtualization infrastructure
by running continuous suspend/resume iterations (40+ cycles) while
churning memory using stress-ng (`stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 60%
--timeout 1`) to constantly create free pages for the buddy allocator. We
also set the `page_reporting_order` parameter to 0 to make the page
reporting worker highly sensitive, forcing it to pick up any 4K free
pages. This confirmed that the UAF crashes are no longer reproducible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: stop fast-leave after deleting a port group
br_multicast_leave_group() iterates mp->ports with pp = &p->next in
its fast-leave path. After br_multicast_del_pg() removes p,
continuing the loop advances pp through the deleted entry.
If multicast-to-unicast was enabled, the bridge can hold multiple port
groups for the same port and group with different source MAC
addresses. Once multicast-to-unicast is disabled,
br_port_group_equal() matches those entries by port only. A fast leave
can then delete one entry and continue from its stale next pointer,
leaving mp->ports pointing at a deleted port group.
Fast leave only needs to remove one matching port group. Break after
br_multicast_del_pg() so the loop stops before dereferencing the
removed entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))
(or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.
However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so
skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20)
only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of
IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear
frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled
linear buffer length.
Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to
the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.
A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.
Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.
ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow
sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count
for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to
zero.
SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload,
then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list.
After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes
8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.
Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform
the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues
to return its existing transport at the limit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: Cancel hrtimer before clearing slave pointer
In i2c_imx_unreg_slave(), the slave pointer is set to NULL after
disabling interrupts. However, a pending interrupt might already
have started the hrtimer (i2c_imx_slave_timeout) before the pointer
was cleared. If the hrtimer fires after i2c_imx->slave is set to
NULL, the timer callback i2c_imx_slave_finish_op() will call
i2c_imx_slave_event() with a NULL slave pointer, which results in a
use-after-free / NULL pointer dereference.
Fix by canceling the hrtimer and waiting for it to complete after
disabling interrupts, before clearing the slave pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: validate CPC message lengths
ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() walks CPC messages packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Check that each declared message fits in the URB payload. Also require the
type-specific payload to cover the fields used by the CAN, state, error and
overrun handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb_leaf: kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd(): validate received command extents
The wait and bulk receive paths walk variable-length commands from a
USB buffer. A nonzero command shorter than CMD_HEADER_LEN can still be
dispatched, and the wait path copies a matching command into a fixed
caller-owned struct kvaser_cmd using the device-provided length.
Reject nonzero commands that do not contain the fixed header or that
extend beyond the current USB buffer item. In the wait path, also reject
a matching command that exceeds the destination before copying it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job
The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are
handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete,
without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data
Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool.
While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread
through branches the binner generated during the current job, the
TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the
hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the "Auto-initialise Tile
State Data Array" flag in the tile binning mode configuration, the
PTB demonstrably still acts on stale tile state left by the slot's
previous user: the binner ends up creating invalid command streams
with invalid primitive streams and branches, which can cause GPU hangs
as observed in [1][2].
Zero the TSDA when the job's binning slot is configured. This clears
48 bytes per tile (~24KB for a 1080p frame) in the submission path, and
guarantees the PTB never sees another job's tile state.
The tile count is only checked for being non-zero today, so the 8-bit
fields it comes from can describe a tile state array almost six times
larger than the slot it has to live in. Bound it before the slot is
handed out, since such size decides how much of the slot is left for
the tile alloc pool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fib6: fix NULL deref in fib6_walk_continue() on multi-batch dump
inet6_dump_fib() saves its progress in cb->args[1] as a positional
index within the current hash chain. Between batches, a concurrent
fib6_new_table() can insert a new table at the chain head, shifting
all existing entries. The saved index then lands on a different
table, causing fib6_dump_table() to set w->root to the wrong table
while w->node still points into the previous one.
fib6_walk_continue() dereferences w->node->parent (NULL) and panics:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
RIP: 0010:fib6_walk_continue+0x6e/0x170
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fib6_dump_table.isra.0+0xc5/0x240
inet6_dump_fib+0xf6/0x420
rtnl_dumpit+0x30/0xa0
netlink_dump+0x15b/0x460
netlink_recvmsg+0x1d6/0x2a0
____sys_recvmsg+0x17a/0x190
Fix by storing tb->tb6_id in cb->args[1] instead of a positional
index. On resume, skip entries until the id matches; a concurrent
head-insert can never match the saved id, so the walker always
resumes on the correct table. |
| A flaw was found in the search-v2-operator. This vulnerability allows a privileged user, specifically a Custom Resource (CR) editor, to manipulate Search CR fields such as imageOverride, arguments, and environment variables without proper validation. By exploiting this, an attacker can mount arbitrary secrets into a search container's environment or replace the container image with an attacker-controlled one. This leads to privilege escalation and can result in a full cluster compromise due to the ServiceAccount's extensive impersonation permissions. |
| No cwe for this issue in Visual Studio Code CoPilot Chat Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Grav Login Plugin adds login, basic ACL, and session wide messages to Grav. Prior to 3.8.11, the Grav Login plugin login.regenerate2FASecret task accepts a top-level GET request through the TaskServiceProvider task: URI parameter without requiring a login-form nonce, an Origin check, or a Referer check. Under the default SameSite=Lax session cookie policy, an off-site navigation can invoke taskRegenerate2FASecret() in a logged-in victim's session, overwrite the victim's TOTP secret, and force two-factor re-enrollment. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.11. |
| Vulnerability in the Siebel CRM Integration product of Oracle Siebel CRM (component: REST). Supported versions that are affected are 17.0-26.6. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Siebel CRM Integration. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Siebel CRM Integration accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Siebel CRM Integration accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.4 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). |
