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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-68153 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free. Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.
CVE-2021-26861 1 Microsoft 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26860 1 Microsoft 9 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 1909 and 6 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows App-V Overlay Filter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26859 1 Microsoft 1 Power Bi Report Server 2026-08-19 7.7 High
Microsoft Power BI Information Disclosure Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26858 1 Microsoft 1 Exchange Server 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26857 1 Microsoft 1 Exchange Server 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2026-68151 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_elf_fdpic: only honour the first PT_INTERP The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays unwritable for as long as the system runs. An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here. The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF binary format driver").
CVE-2021-26855 1 Microsoft 1 Exchange Server 2026-08-19 9.1 Critical
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26854 1 Microsoft 1 Exchange Server 2026-08-19 6.6 Medium
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-26412 1 Microsoft 1 Exchange Server 2026-08-19 9.1 Critical
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24110 1 Microsoft 2 Hevc Video Extensions, High Efficiency Video Coding 2026-08-19 7.8 High
HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2026-68148 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key() The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY. It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys). The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when the last inode that references the key is evicted. However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later. Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct super_block structs. Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent ("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.
CVE-2021-24107 1 Microsoft 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more 2026-08-19 5.5 Medium
Windows Event Tracing Information Disclosure Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24090 1 Microsoft 8 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 1909 and 5 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24104 1 Microsoft 6 Sharepoint Enterprise Server, Sharepoint Foundation, Sharepoint Foundation 2013 and 3 more 2026-08-19 4.6 Medium
Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability
CVE-2021-1640 1 Microsoft 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24089 1 Microsoft 2 Hevc Video Extensions, High Efficiency Video Coding 2026-08-19 7.8 High
HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2026-68147 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
CVE-2021-27083 1 Microsoft 1 Remote Development 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Remote Development Extension for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27082 1 Microsoft 1 Quantum Development Kit 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Quantum Development Kit for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability