| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxbf_gige: stop interface during shutdown
The mlxbf_gige driver intermittantly encounters a NULL pointer
exception while the system is shutting down via "reboot" command.
The mlxbf_driver will experience an exception right after executing
its shutdown() method. One example of this exception is:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000070
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000011d373000
[0000000000000070] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G S OE 5.15.0-bf.6.gef6992a #1
Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField SoC/BlueField SoC, BIOS 4.0.2.12669 Apr 21 2023
pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mlxbf_gige_handle_tx_complete+0xc8/0x170 [mlxbf_gige]
lr : mlxbf_gige_poll+0x54/0x160 [mlxbf_gige]
sp : ffff8000080d3c10
x29: ffff8000080d3c10 x28: ffffcce72cbb7000 x27: ffff8000080d3d58
x26: ffff0000814e7340 x25: ffff331cd1a05000 x24: ffffcce72c4ea008
x23: ffff0000814e4b40 x22: ffff0000814e4d10 x21: ffff0000814e4128
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000814e4a80 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 000000000000001c x16: ffffcce72b4553f4 x15: ffff80008805b8a7
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000030 x12: 0101010101010101
x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: c2ac898b17576267 x9 : ffffcce720fa5404
x8 : ffff000080812138 x7 : 0000000000002e9a x6 : 0000000000000080
x5 : ffff00008de3b000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
mlxbf_gige_handle_tx_complete+0xc8/0x170 [mlxbf_gige]
mlxbf_gige_poll+0x54/0x160 [mlxbf_gige]
__napi_poll+0x40/0x1c8
net_rx_action+0x314/0x3a0
__do_softirq+0x128/0x334
run_ksoftirqd+0x54/0x6c
smpboot_thread_fn+0x14c/0x190
kthread+0x10c/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: 8b070000 f9000ea0 f95056c0 f86178a1 (b9407002)
---[ end trace 7cc3941aa0d8e6a4 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
Kernel Offset: 0x4ce722520000 from 0xffff800008000000
PHYS_OFFSET: 0x80000000
CPU features: 0x000005c1,a3330e5a
Memory Limit: none
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
During system shutdown, the mlxbf_gige driver's shutdown() is always executed.
However, the driver's stop() method will only execute if networking interface
configuration logic within the Linux distribution has been setup to do so.
If shutdown() executes but stop() does not execute, NAPI remains enabled
and this can lead to an exception if NAPI is scheduled while the hardware
interface has only been partially deinitialized.
The networking interface managed by the mlxbf_gige driver must be properly
stopped during system shutdown so that IFF_UP is cleared, the hardware
interface is put into a clean state, and NAPI is fully deinitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix possible use-after-free during activity update
The rule activity update delayed work periodically traverses the list of
configured rules and queries their activity from the device.
As part of this task it accesses the entry pointed by 'ventry->entry',
but this entry can be changed concurrently by the rehash delayed work,
leading to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by closing the race and perform the activity query under the
'vregion->lock' mutex.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054ed808 by task kworker/0:18/181
CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00781-gd5ab772d32f7 #2
Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019
Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
print_report+0xce/0x670
kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140
mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x219/0x400
process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0
worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70
kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1039:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc+0x19c/0x360
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x7b/0x1f0
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x30d/0xb50
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300
process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0
worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70
kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 1039:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
poison_slab_object+0x102/0x170
__kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30
kfree+0xc1/0x290
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x3d7/0xb50
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300
process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0
worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70
kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix memory leak during rehash
The rehash delayed work migrates filters from one region to another.
This is done by iterating over all chunks (all the filters with the same
priority) in the region and in each chunk iterating over all the
filters.
If the migration fails, the code tries to migrate the filters back to
the old region. However, the rollback itself can also fail in which case
another migration will be erroneously performed. Besides the fact that
this ping pong is not a very good idea, it also creates a problem.
Each virtual chunk references two chunks: The currently used one
('vchunk->chunk') and a backup ('vchunk->chunk2'). During migration the
first holds the chunk we want to migrate filters to and the second holds
the chunk we are migrating filters from.
The code currently assumes - but does not verify - that the backup chunk
does not exist (NULL) if the currently used chunk does not reference the
target region. This assumption breaks when we are trying to rollback a
rollback, resulting in the backup chunk being overwritten and leaked
[1].
Fix by not rolling back a failed rollback and add a warning to avoid
future cases.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1063 at lib/parman.c:291 parman_destroy+0x17/0x20
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/5:11 Tainted: G W 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00784-gc6a05c468a0b #14
Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019
Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work
RIP: 0010:parman_destroy+0x17/0x20
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlxsw_sp_acl_atcam_region_fini+0x19/0x60
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_region_destroy+0x49/0xf0
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x1f1/0x470
process_one_work+0x151/0x370
worker_thread+0x2cb/0x3e0
kthread+0xd0/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix memory leak when canceling rehash work
The rehash delayed work is rescheduled with a delay if the number of
credits at end of the work is not negative as supposedly it means that
the migration ended. Otherwise, it is rescheduled immediately.
After "mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix possible use-after-free during
rehash" the above is no longer accurate as a non-negative number of
credits is no longer indicative of the migration being done. It can also
happen if the work encountered an error in which case the migration will
resume the next time the work is scheduled.
The significance of the above is that it is possible for the work to be
pending and associated with hints that were allocated when the migration
started. This leads to the hints being leaked [1] when the work is
canceled while pending as part of ACL region dismantle.
Fix by freeing the hints if hints are associated with a work that was
canceled while pending.
Blame the original commit since the reliance on not having a pending
work associated with hints is fragile.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff88810e7c3000 (size 256):
comm "kworker/0:16", pid 176, jiffies 4295460353
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 30 95 11 81 88 ff ff 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 .0......a.......
00 00 61 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ..a.@...........
backtrace (crc 2544ddb9):
[<00000000cf8cfab3>] kmalloc_trace+0x23f/0x2a0
[<000000004d9a1ad9>] objagg_hints_get+0x42/0x390
[<000000000b143cf3>] mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_rehash_hints_get+0xca/0x400
[<0000000059bdb60a>] mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x868/0x1160
[<00000000e81fd734>] process_one_work+0x59c/0xf20
[<00000000ceee9e81>] worker_thread+0x799/0x12c0
[<00000000bda6fe39>] kthread+0x246/0x300
[<0000000070056d23>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
[<00000000dea2b93e>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Prevent double free on error
The error handling path in its_vpe_irq_domain_alloc() causes a double free
when its_vpe_init() fails after successfully allocating at least one
interrupt. This happens because its_vpe_irq_domain_free() frees the
interrupts along with the area bitmap and the vprop_page and
its_vpe_irq_domain_alloc() subsequently frees the area bitmap and the
vprop_page again.
Fix this by unconditionally invoking its_vpe_irq_domain_free() which
handles all cases correctly and by removing the bitmap/vprop_page freeing
from its_vpe_irq_domain_alloc().
[ tglx: Massaged change log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcm80211: handle pmk_op allocation failure
The kzalloc() in brcmf_pmksa_v3_op() will return null if the
physical memory has run out. As a result, if we dereference
the null value, the null pointer dereference bug will happen.
Return -ENOMEM from brcmf_pmksa_v3_op() if kzalloc() fails
for pmk_op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfp: flower: handle acti_netdevs allocation failure
The kmalloc_array() in nfp_fl_lag_do_work() will return null, if
the physical memory has run out. As a result, if we dereference
the acti_netdevs, the null pointer dereference bugs will happen.
This patch adds a check to judge whether allocation failure occurs.
If it happens, the delayed work will be rescheduled and try again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Create debugfs ttm_resource_manager entry only if needed
The driver creates /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/mob_ttm even when the
corresponding ttm_resource_manager is not allocated.
This leads to a crash when trying to read from this file.
Add a check to create mob_ttm, system_mob_ttm, and gmr_ttm debug file
only when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is allocated.
crash> bt
PID: 3133409 TASK: ffff8fe4834a5000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "grep"
#0 [ffffb954506b3b20] machine_kexec at ffffffffb2a6bec3
#1 [ffffb954506b3b78] __crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb598a
#2 [ffffb954506b3c38] crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb68c1
#3 [ffffb954506b3c50] oops_end at ffffffffb2a2a9b1
#4 [ffffb954506b3c70] no_context at ffffffffb2a7e913
#5 [ffffb954506b3cc8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffb2a7ec8c
#6 [ffffb954506b3d10] do_page_fault at ffffffffb2a7f887
#7 [ffffb954506b3d40] page_fault at ffffffffb360116e
[exception RIP: ttm_resource_manager_debug+0x11]
RIP: ffffffffc04afd11 RSP: ffffb954506b3df0 RFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8fe41a6d1200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000940
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc04b4338 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffb954506b3e08 R8: ffff8fee3ffad000 R9: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8fe41a76a000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8fe5bb6f3900 R15: ffff8fe41a6d1200
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#8 [ffffb954506b3e00] ttm_resource_manager_show at ffffffffc04afde7 [ttm]
#9 [ffffb954506b3e30] seq_read at ffffffffb2d8f9f3
RIP: 00007f4c4eda8985 RSP: 00007ffdbba9e9f8 RFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000037e000 RCX: 00007f4c4eda8985
RDX: 000000000037e000 RSI: 00007f4c41573000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000037e000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000037fe30
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4c41573000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f4c41572010 R15: 0000000000000003
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 CS: 0033 SS: 002b |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: fix memory leak in cachefiles_add_cache()
The following memory leak was reported after unbinding /dev/cachefiles:
==================================================================
unreferenced object 0xffff9b674176e3c0 (size 192):
comm "cachefilesd2", pid 680, jiffies 4294881224
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc ea38a44b):
[<ffffffff8eb8a1a5>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x2d5/0x370
[<ffffffff8e917f86>] prepare_creds+0x26/0x2e0
[<ffffffffc002eeef>] cachefiles_determine_cache_security+0x1f/0x120
[<ffffffffc00243ec>] cachefiles_add_cache+0x13c/0x3a0
[<ffffffffc0025216>] cachefiles_daemon_write+0x146/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8ebc4a3b>] vfs_write+0xcb/0x520
[<ffffffff8ebc5069>] ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
[<ffffffff8f6d4662>] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x140
[<ffffffff8f8000aa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
==================================================================
Put the reference count of cache_cred in cachefiles_daemon_unbind() to
fix the problem. And also put cache_cred in cachefiles_add_cache() error
branch to avoid memory leaks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: switchdev: Skip MDB replays of deferred events on offload
Before this change, generation of the list of MDB events to replay
would race against the creation of new group memberships, either from
the IGMP/MLD snooping logic or from user configuration.
While new memberships are immediately visible to walkers of
br->mdb_list, the notification of their existence to switchdev event
subscribers is deferred until a later point in time. So if a replay
list was generated during a time that overlapped with such a window,
it would also contain a replay of the not-yet-delivered event.
The driver would thus receive two copies of what the bridge internally
considered to be one single event. On destruction of the bridge, only
a single membership deletion event was therefore sent. As a
consequence of this, drivers which reference count memberships (at
least DSA), would be left with orphan groups in their hardware
database when the bridge was destroyed.
This is only an issue when replaying additions. While deletion events
may still be pending on the deferred queue, they will already have
been removed from br->mdb_list, so no duplicates can be generated in
that scenario.
To a user this meant that old group memberships, from a bridge in
which a port was previously attached, could be reanimated (in
hardware) when the port joined a new bridge, without the new bridge's
knowledge.
For example, on an mv88e6xxx system, create a snooping bridge and
immediately add a port to it:
root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link add dev br0 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 && \
> ip link set dev x3 up master br0
And then destroy the bridge:
root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link del dev br0
root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ mvls atu
ADDRESS FID STATE Q F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a
DEV:0 Marvell 88E6393X
33:33:00:00:00:6a 1 static - - 0 . . . . . . . . . .
33:33:ff:87:e4:3f 1 static - - 0 . . . . . . . . . .
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 1 static - - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a
root@infix-06-0b-00:~$
The two IPv6 groups remain in the hardware database because the
port (x3) is notified of the host's membership twice: once via the
original event and once via a replay. Since only a single delete
notification is sent, the count remains at 1 when the bridge is
destroyed.
Then add the same port (or another port belonging to the same hardware
domain) to a new bridge, this time with snooping disabled:
root@infix-06-0b-00:~$ ip link add dev br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 0 && \
> ip link set dev x3 up master br1
All multicast, including the two IPv6 groups from br0, should now be
flooded, according to the policy of br1. But instead the old
memberships are still active in the hardware database, causing the
switch to only forward traffic to those groups towards the CPU (port
0).
Eliminate the race in two steps:
1. Grab the write-side lock of the MDB while generating the replay
list.
This prevents new memberships from showing up while we are generating
the replay list. But it leaves the scenario in which a deferred event
was already generated, but not delivered, before we grabbed the
lock. Therefore:
2. Make sure that no deferred version of a replay event is already
enqueued to the switchdev deferred queue, before adding it to the
replay list, when replaying additions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srpt: Support specifying the srpt_service_guid parameter
Make loading ib_srpt with this parameter set work. The current behavior is
that setting that parameter while loading the ib_srpt kernel module
triggers the following kernel crash:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
parse_one+0x18c/0x1d0
parse_args+0xe1/0x230
load_module+0x8de/0xa60
init_module_from_file+0x8b/0xd0
idempotent_init_module+0x181/0x240
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x5a/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/qedr: Fix qedr_create_user_qp error flow
Avoid the following warning by making sure to free the allocated
resources in case that qedr_init_user_queue() fail.
-----------[ cut here ]-----------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 143192 at drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c:874 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
Modules linked in: tls target_core_user uio target_core_pscsi target_core_file target_core_iblock ib_srpt ib_srp scsi_transport_srp nfsd nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs 8021q garp mrp stp llc ext4 mbcache jbd2 opa_vnic ib_umad ib_ipoib sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm hfi1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common mgag200 qedr sb_edac drm_shmem_helper rdmavt x86_pkg_temp_thermal drm_kms_helper intel_powerclamp ib_uverbs coretemp i2c_algo_bit kvm_intel dell_wmi_descriptor ipmi_ssif sparse_keymap kvm ib_core rfkill syscopyarea sysfillrect video sysimgblt irqbypass ipmi_si ipmi_devintf fb_sys_fops rapl iTCO_wdt mxm_wmi iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate pcspkr dcdbas intel_uncore ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter mei_me mei fuse drm xfs libcrc32c qede sd_mod ahci libahci t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel qed libata tg3
ghash_clmulni_intel megaraid_sas crc8 wmi [last unloaded: ib_srpt]
CPU: 0 PID: 143192 Comm: fi_rdm_tagged_p Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-408.el9.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R430/03XKDV, BIOS 2.14.0 01/25/2022
RIP: 0010:uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
Code: 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 0f 26 1b dd 48 89 df e8 67 6a ff ff 49 8b 86 10 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 9c 4c 89 e7 e8 83 c0 cb dd eb 92 <0f> 0b eb be 0f 0b be 04 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 8e f5 ff ff e9 6d ff
RSP: 0018:ffffb7c6cadfbc60 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8f0889ee3f60 RBX: ffff8f088c1a5200 RCX: 00000000802a0016
RDX: 00000000802a0017 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8f0880042600
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8f11fffd5000 R11: 0000000000039000 R12: ffff8f0d5b36cd80
R13: ffff8f088c1a5250 R14: ffff8f1206d91000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f11d7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000147069200e20 CR3: 00000001c7210002 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
? __warn+0x81/0x110
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
? report_bug+0x10a/0x140
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]
__fput+0x94/0x250
task_work_run+0x5c/0x90
do_exit+0x270/0x4a0
do_group_exit+0x2d/0x90
get_signal+0x87c/0x8c0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x100
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc2/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x9c/0x130
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb6/0x100
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x1470abe3ec6b
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x1470abe3ec41.
RSP: 002b:00007fff13ce9108 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: fffffffffffffffc RBX: 00007fff13ce9218 RCX: 00001470abe3ec6b
RDX: 00007fff13ce9200 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fff13ce91e0 R08: 0000558d9655da10 R09: 0000558d9655dd00
R10: 00007fff13ce95c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff13ce9358
R13: 0000000000000013 R14: 0000558d9655db50 R15: 00007fff13ce9470
</TASK>
--[ end trace 888a9b92e04c5c97 ]-- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: use the backlog for mirred ingress
The test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 ("act_mirred: use the backlog
for nested calls to mirred ingress") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so
runs, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by
lockdep.
The problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that
if we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)
we may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may
still be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks
is to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path
inline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once
we started to nest mirred calls.
In the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will
lead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current
workaround does not seem to address the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix possible use-after-free and null-ptr-deref
The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered
before registering the generic netlink family. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().
syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0]
When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour
entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data.
The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so
the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes.
In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field,
arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's
not a problem.
However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN),
arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL)
in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get().
To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy().
Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible
array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller.
[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000
R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261
inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981
sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204
sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce
RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid-of: fix NULL-deref on failed power up
A while back the I2C HID implementation was split in an ACPI and OF
part, but the new OF driver never initialises the client pointer which
is dereferenced on power-up failures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix double-free of blocks due to wrong extents moved_len
In ext4_move_extents(), moved_len is only updated when all moves are
successfully executed, and only discards orig_inode and donor_inode
preallocations when moved_len is not zero. When the loop fails to exit
after successfully moving some extents, moved_len is not updated and
remains at 0, so it does not discard the preallocations.
If the moved extents overlap with the preallocated extents, the
overlapped extents are freed twice in ext4_mb_release_inode_pa() and
ext4_process_freed_data() (as described in commit 94d7c16cbbbd ("ext4:
Fix double-free of blocks with EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT")), and bb_free is
incremented twice. Hence when trim is executed, a zero-division bug is
triggered in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() because bb_free is not zero
and bb_fragments is zero.
Therefore, update move_len after each extent move to avoid the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hv_netvsc: Fix race condition between netvsc_probe and netvsc_remove
In commit ac5047671758 ("hv_netvsc: Disable NAPI before closing the
VMBus channel"), napi_disable was getting called for all channels,
including all subchannels without confirming if they are enabled or not.
This caused hv_netvsc getting hung at napi_disable, when netvsc_probe()
has finished running but nvdev->subchan_work has not started yet.
netvsc_subchan_work() -> rndis_set_subchannel() has not created the
sub-channels and because of that netvsc_sc_open() is not running.
netvsc_remove() calls cancel_work_sync(&nvdev->subchan_work), for which
netvsc_subchan_work did not run.
netif_napi_add() sets the bit NAPI_STATE_SCHED because it ensures NAPI
cannot be scheduled. Then netvsc_sc_open() -> napi_enable will clear the
NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit, so it can be scheduled. napi_disable() does the
opposite.
Now during netvsc_device_remove(), when napi_disable is called for those
subchannels, napi_disable gets stuck on infinite msleep.
This fix addresses this problem by ensuring that napi_disable() is not
getting called for non-enabled NAPI struct.
But netif_napi_del() is still necessary for these non-enabled NAPI struct
for cleanup purpose.
Call trace:
[ 654.559417] task:modprobe state:D stack: 0 pid: 2321 ppid: 1091 flags:0x00004002
[ 654.568030] Call Trace:
[ 654.571221] <TASK>
[ 654.573790] __schedule+0x2d6/0x960
[ 654.577733] schedule+0x69/0xf0
[ 654.581214] schedule_timeout+0x87/0x140
[ 654.585463] ? __bpf_trace_tick_stop+0x20/0x20
[ 654.590291] msleep+0x2d/0x40
[ 654.593625] napi_disable+0x2b/0x80
[ 654.597437] netvsc_device_remove+0x8a/0x1f0 [hv_netvsc]
[ 654.603935] rndis_filter_device_remove+0x194/0x1c0 [hv_netvsc]
[ 654.611101] ? do_wait_intr+0xb0/0xb0
[ 654.615753] netvsc_remove+0x7c/0x120 [hv_netvsc]
[ 654.621675] vmbus_remove+0x27/0x40 [hv_vmbus] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations
- Disallow families other than NFPROTO_{IPV4,IPV6,INET}.
- Disallow layer 4 protocol with no ports, since destination port is a
mandatory attribute for this object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload
When a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the
underlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the
associated filter block using the 'FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND' command. The stack
then continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for
this driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the
'reoffload' operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the
classifier in its 'reoffload' operation prepares and emits a
'FLOW_CLS_DESTROY' command for each filter.
However, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the
underlying driver never receives a 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY' command when
a qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be
reproduced using [2].
Fix by introducing a 'tmplt_reoffload' operation and have the stack
invoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay.
Implement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain
templates (flower) by emitting the 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY}'
command based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a
filter block or being unbound from one.
As far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which
reordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains()
in __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block
is expected to be freed after flushing all the chains.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048):
comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff ..|......[......
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320
[<ffffffff81ab374e>] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90
[<ffffffff832aec6d>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0
[<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180
[<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280
[<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340
[<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0
[<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170
[<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0
[<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440
[<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820
[<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0
[<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80
[<ffffffff8379d29a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8379d50c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0
[<ffffffff843b9ce0>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
unreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024):
comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00 @.......W.8.....
10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff ..,m......,m....
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320
[<ffffffff81ab36c1>] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90
[<ffffffff81a8ed96>] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0
[<ffffffff82827d03>] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460
[<ffffffff82828d2b>] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0
[<ffffffff832aed48>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0
[<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180
[<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280
[<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340
[<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0
[<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170
[<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0
[<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440
[<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820
[<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0
[<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80
[2]
# tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact
# tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32
# tc qdisc del dev
---truncated--- |
