| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost_iotlb: bound map allocation in add_range
vhost_iotlb_add_range_ctx() only retires an old entry when the table
has a non-zero limit, has exactly reached that limit and has
VHOST_IOTLB_FLAG_RETIRE set. Non-retiring tables can keep allocating
entries after reaching their configured limit.
Existing vhost devices allocate their IOTLB with max_iotlb_entries from
vhost.c, which defaults to 2048 and is tunable by module parameter. Use
the caller-provided limit at the allocation point instead of adding a
separate default in the common IOTLB helper, and reject non-positive
values in vhost paths that can report an error.
Other vhost IOTLB users should not create zero-limit tables when entries
can be populated from userspace or guest-controlled requests. Add
caller-side max_iotlb_entries parameters for mlx5 vDPA, VDUSE and
vhost-vDPA. Reject non-positive VDUSE and vhost-vDPA values, and require
at least two entries for vdpa_sim and mlx5 vDPA paths that install
full-range mappings, since those mappings are split into two IOTLB
entries.
Handle full-range mappings in the common helper by checking that the
IOTLB can hold both split entries before inserting the first half. This
avoids returning an error after leaving a half mapping behind.
When the table is full, keep the existing retire behavior for retiring
tables and return -ENOSPC for non-retiring tables. Reuse the retired map
node instead of freeing it and allocating a replacement, so a stream of
IOTLB updates cannot keep forcing GFP_ATOMIC allocations after the table
has reached its limit. If a zero-limit IOTLB still reaches the common
helper, treat it as a configuration error and return -EINVAL.
I found this bug myself, though the patch was written with AI assistance. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: FCP: fix OOB write in fcp_meter_ctl_get()
fcp_ioctl_set_meter_map() bounds the user-supplied Level Meter map size
by the driver's own limit of 255
if (map.map_size < 1 || map.map_size > 255 ||
map.meter_slots < 1 || map.meter_slots > 255)
return -EINVAL;
and passes it to fcp_add_new_ctl() as the control's channel count, where
it is stored as elem->channels.
Every control read writes into struct snd_ctl_elem_value, whose integer
array is declared long value[128], so the limit is 128, not 255.
fcp_meter_ctl_get() stores one 64-bit word per channel into that array
with no bound of its own:
for (i = 0; i < elem->channels; i++) {
int idx = private->meter_level_map[i];
int value = idx < 0 ? 0 : le32_to_cpu(resp[idx]);
ucontrol->value.integer.value[i] = value;
}
snd_ctl_elem_read_user() serves that object from
memdup_user(_control, sizeof(*control)), 1224 bytes on LP64 out of
kmalloc-2048. offsetof(struct snd_ctl_elem_value, value) is 72, so
element i is written at byte 72 + 8 * i and element 144 already lands
past the allocation. At map_size 255 the last store ends at byte 2112,
888 bytes past the object and 64 bytes into the adjacent slab object.
The stored words come from the device and meter_level_map[] selects
which word lands in which slot, so extent and contents are both
controlled.
The core does not catch this. snd_ctl_check_elem_info() is reached only
from __snd_ctl_elem_info(), which snd_ctl_elem_read() calls under
CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG; without that option snd_ctl_skip_validation() is a
compile-time true. __snd_ctl_add_replace() validates kcontrol->count and
never inspects elem->channels.
Installing an oversized map needs CAP_SYS_RAWIO, but the control outlives
the hwdep descriptor that created it, so the out-of-bounds stores are
issued by any process able to read controls on /dev/snd/controlC0.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), triggered by an unprivileged control read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fcp_meter_ctl_get
Write of size 8 at addr ffff000017af04c8 by task fcp_trigger/185
__asan_store8
fcp_meter_ctl_get
snd_ctl_elem_read
snd_ctl_ioctl
Allocated by task 185:
memdup_user
snd_ctl_ioctl
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 1224-byte region [ffff000017af0000, ffff000017af04c8)
Bound the map size by the ABI limit rather than by 255, and bound the
store loop at the sink so it cannot run past the value array whatever
elem->channels holds.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb: Fix UAF at delayed release of MIDI2 EPs
The recent fix for UAF in ump_to_endpoint() caused another UAF because
it tries to dereference the UMP endpoint object, but this might be
executed at a delayed context where the endpoint has been already
released.
Add private_free to clear the associated data for avoiding the further
dereference for delayed releases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: fastrpc: Remove buffer from list prior to unmap operation
fastrpc_req_munmap_impl() is called to unmap any buffer. The buffer is
getting removed from the list after it is unmapped from DSP. This can
create potential race conditions if multiple threads invoke unmap
concurrently, where one thread may remove the entry from the list while
another thread's unmap operation is still ongoing.
Fix this by removing the buffer entry from the list before calling the
unmap operation. If the unmap fails, the entry is re-added to the list
so that userspace can retry the unmap, or alternatively, the buffer
will be cleaned up during device release when the DSP process is torn
down and all DSP-side mappings are freed along with remaining buffers
in the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebt_nflog: pin the NFLOG backend
nf_log_unregister() runs after the per-net teardown so its final RCU
grace period also drains readers that obtained the logger from a per-net
binding. However, ebt_nflog passes an explicit ULOG log type to
nf_log_packet() without holding a reference on the selected logger module,
unlike the xt_NFLOG and nft_log frontends.
An ebtables nflog rule can therefore remain callable while nfnetlink_log
is unloaded. The resulting interleaving is:
CPU 0 CPU 1
nfnetlink_log_fini()
unregister_pernet_subsys()
kfree(nfnl_log_pernet(net))
ebt_nflog_tg()
nf_log_packet()
nfulnl_log_packet()
instance_lookup_get_rcu()
The global ULOG logger is still registered at this point, so CPU 1
dereferences the per-net state after CPU 0 has freed it. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instance_lookup_get_rcu
Read of size 8 at addr ff110001052e6210 by task poc/92
Call Trace:
instance_lookup_get_rcu+0x1ce/0x1f0 [nfnetlink_log]
nfulnl_log_packet+0x248/0x2fb0 [nfnetlink_log]
nf_log_packet+0x204/0x300
ebt_nflog_tg+0x351/0x550
ebt_do_table+0xedf/0x22b0
Allocated by task 90:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x186/0x470
ops_init+0x6d/0x420
register_pernet_operations+0x2f6/0x670
register_pernet_subsys+0x23/0x40
Freed by task 93:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
ops_undo_list+0x3e3/0x700
unregister_pernet_operations+0x232/0x490
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
nfnetlink_log_fini+0x34/0x450 [nfnetlink_log]
Acquire the ULOG logger module reference when an ebt_nflog rule is
validated and release it when the rule is destroyed. Request the NFLOG
backend for legacy callers when needed, matching xt_NFLOG. This prevents
module teardown until all ebt_nflog rules have stopped using the logger. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic
When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the
destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer.
Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is
tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields.
Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand
while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves
the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity
fields consistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix memory leak in btrfs_do_encoded_write()
Local fuzzing of 6.12.94 has found the following memory leak:
Unreferenced object 0xffff888018050a80 (size 64):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 10297, jiffies 4294953601
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
10 0a 05 18 80 88 ff ff 10 0a 05 18 80 88 ff ff ................
backtrace (crc a8a6fc29):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
extent_changeset_alloc fs/btrfs/extent_io.h:207 [inline]
qgroup_reserve_data+0x1c5/0x7d0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:4305
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x2e/0xb0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:4355
btrfs_do_encoded_write+0x92e/0x1040 fs/btrfs/inode.c:9746
btrfs_encoded_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1482 [inline]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x280/0x610 fs/btrfs/file.c:1507
btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0x3d6/0x490 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4738
btrfs_ioctl+0x6f9/0xc90 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:-1
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Unreferenced object 0xffff888018050a00 (size 64):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 10297, jiffies 4294953601
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 0f 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
90 0a 05 18 80 88 ff ff 90 0a 05 18 80 88 ff ff ................
backtrace (crc cb5c9580):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
ulist_prealloc+0x9c/0x110 fs/btrfs/ulist.c:114
extent_changeset_prealloc fs/btrfs/extent_io.h:217 [inline]
__set_extent_bit+0x16b/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1086
set_record_extent_bits+0x50/0x90 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1821
qgroup_reserve_data+0x274/0x7d0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:4312
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x2e/0xb0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:4355
btrfs_do_encoded_write+0x92e/0x1040 fs/btrfs/inode.c:9746
btrfs_encoded_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1482 [inline]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x280/0x610 fs/btrfs/file.c:1507
btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0x3d6/0x490 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4738
btrfs_ioctl+0x6f9/0xc90 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:-1
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fix this by freeing an extent changeset before returning from
btrfs_do_encoded_write(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
enic: fix tx_hang_reset use-after-free on device removal
enic_remove() cancels the reset and change_mtu_work items but does not
cancel tx_hang_reset. A TX timeout that fires while the device is being
removed can schedule enic_tx_hang_reset() so that it runs after
free_netdev(), resulting in a use-after-free.
cancel_work_sync() alone is not sufficient here: the still-live watchdog
and notify paths can re-schedule these work items in the window between
the cancel and unregister_netdev(). Use disable_work_sync(), which
cancels the work and blocks any subsequent schedule_work() from
requeuing it, and apply it to the reset and change_mtu_work items as
well so the same requeue race is closed for all teardown work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor
bond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and
takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the
active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL
(RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()),
which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The
monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no
failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed
over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's
promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor
RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Re-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so
the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding
monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase
(bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only
one acting on the pre-trylock decision. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Skip sub-disable teardown for never-linked sub-schedulers
A sub-scheduler enable can fail before scx_link_sched() links the sched into
the hierarchy, e.g. when the parent is already being disabled, and cleanup
still runs the full scx_sub_disable().
That is racy against root disable: drain_descendants() is the only ordering
between a sub's disable-time task walk and root disable's all-task teardown,
and an unlinked sub is invisible to it. Root's teardown can thus run between
the never-linked sub's drain and its walk, exiting every task to no
scheduler.
The walk then trips the membership WARN and re-homes the exited tasks onto
the dying hierarchy, a use-after-free.
Skip the cgroup ownership reset and the task walk if @sch was never linked,
indicated by the empty ->sibling as unlinking only happens later in the same
function. The membership WARN remains valid: a linked sub is always waited
on by an ancestor's drain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Check for tg ops in dce110_set_avmute
Some older DCE timing generators do not implement is_tg_enabled in
their ops table. Calling it unconditionally when waiting for AV mute
frames causes a NULL pointer dereference on Southern Islands dGPUs
when turning the display off over HDMI.
Check that tg and the required ops exist before waiting for frames.
(cherry picked from commit 2686a0c0aaa07bec2e24131835cf27b5fd4935a5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec()
eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop
position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances
by reading list.next from the removed child.
If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu
union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read.
The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed
child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running.
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to save the next sibling before recursively
removing the current child. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: stop estimator after disabled calc phase
IPVS estimator kthread 0 starts with zeroed chain and tick limits until
its initial calculation phase completes. If network namespace teardown
clears ipvs->enable during that phase, ip_vs_est_calc_phase() can return
without installing positive limits.
The kthread can then continue into its main loop and drain
est_temp_list with zero chain_max, tick_max and est_max_count values.
Each enqueue consumes one available tick row, but est_count never
reaches the zero est_max_count value. After all rows are consumed, the
row lookup returns IPVS_EST_NTICKS and ip_vs_enqueue_estimator() writes
past the ticks and tick_len arrays.
Exit kthread 0 after the calculation phase if the kthread is stopping or
IPVS has been disabled. That keeps temporary estimators from being
drained after the limits failed to initialize.
Estimator kthreads can now self-exit before teardown or reload stops
kd->task. Keep an extra task reference after creation and release it
with kthread_stop_put(), so kd->task remains valid until the stop paths
consume that reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: add permission check for KDSKBMETA ioctl
KDSKBMETA modifies keyboard meta mode but lacks the !perm check that all
other keyboard setter ioctls in vt_k_ioctl() enforce, allowing a process
to change meta mode on a non-controlling console without authorization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: ax88179_178a: fix skb leak in ax88179_tx_fixup()
When the interface has NETIF_F_SG enabled and skb_linearize() fails in
ax88179_tx_fixup(), the function returns NULL without freeing the skb.
usbnet_start_xmit() treats a NULL return from tx_fixup() as a drop
(info->flags does not set FLAG_MULTI_PACKET for this driver), jumping
to the "drop" label where it does `if (skb) dev_kfree_skb_any(skb)`.
Because tx_fixup() returned NULL, the local skb variable in
usbnet_start_xmit() is NULL, so the original skb is never freed — a
memory leak on every TX frame whose linearization fails (i.e. under
memory pressure).
Free the skb before returning, matching the error handling already used
for the pskb_expand_head() failure path in the same function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6ip6_err()
ip6ip6_err() clones an outer IPv6 ICMP error skb, pulls it to the
quoted inner IPv6 packet, and then passes the clone to icmpv6_send().
The clone still carries the outer packet's inet6_skb_parm in skb->cb.
If the outer packet had a Home Address Option, IP6CB(skb2)->dsthao
remains non-zero after skb_pull(). icmpv6_send() later calls
mip6_addr_swap(), which uses that stale dsthao offset against the quoted
inner packet. A malformed inner destination-options header can then make
the HAO lookup and address swap run past the end of the quoted packet
and corrupt skb_shared_info.
Clear skb2->cb[] before pulling the quoted inner IPv6 packet so the
reply path does not reuse metadata left by the outer IPv6 stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix Route Information option length validation
rt6_route_rcv() validates the Route Information option (RFC 4191) length
against the prefix length, but both checks are off by one.
rinfo->length is the ND option length in units of 8 octets and it
*includes* the 8-byte option header, so an option carrying N bytes of
prefix has length == 1 + N/8. RFC 4191 section 2.3 requires length 3
when Prefix Length is greater than 64, and 2 or 3 when it is greater
than 0. The code accepts length >= 2 and length >= 1 respectively.
ipv6_addr_prefix() then copies prefix_len/8 bytes out of rinfo->prefix,
so a Router Advertisement with (prefix_len=128, length=2) or
(prefix_len=64, length=1) makes the kernel read up to 8 bytes past the
end of the option. Those bytes end up in the prefix of the route that
gets installed, so they are visible to userspace:
# RA with a Route Information option (prefix_len=128, length=2)
# followed by a source link-layer address option, 01 01 de ad be ef ca fe
$ ip -6 route show
2001:db8:dead:beef:101:dead:beef:cafe via fe80::1234 dev veth0 proto ra
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ the next option, read out of bounds
When the Route Information option is the last one in the packet, those
eight bytes come from the skb tail room instead.
Reject the option lengths RFC 4191 does not allow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dibs: initialise dibs->lock in dibs_dev_alloc()
dibs->lock is initialised by dibs_dev_add(), but a dibs device can
already take interrupts before that call: ism_probe() runs
ism_dev_init(), and hence request_irq(), before it calls
dibs_dev_add(). No client can have registered a dmb at that point, so
no dmb interrupt can occur, but a GID event interrupt can, and
ism_handle_irq() takes dibs->lock unconditionally on entry, before it
inspects anything else.
Initialise the lock in dibs_dev_alloc() instead, so that it is valid as
soon as a driver can publish the device to its interrupt handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rqspinlock: Reset tail when preserving queue on deadlock
Currently, the destruction of the waiter queue is suppressed for
rqspinlock in cases where a deadlock is detected. Deadlock checks happen
relatively frequently (on entry for AA, within 1ms for ABBA), and waiter
threads may not be involved in locking scenarios involving deadlocks.
Thus, it is useful to not flush the queue and let other waiters take a
stab at acquiring the lock after we detect a deadlock and exit.
However, we need to follow the same logic as what we did previously for
the waitq_timeout label: reset the tail, and if we cannot, signal the
next waiter appropriately. In case of deadlocks, this signal would just
mark the MCS node as unlocked, and in case of timeouts, it would signal
RES_TIMEOUT_VAL. The difference thus is in the value propagated, which
decides whether the queue remains active or gets flushed.
Not doing the tail reset, and waiting for the next waiter can lead to
cases where we are the final waiter, and thus no next waiter arrives,
leading to intermittent stalls in this path. Once the next waiter does
join, we will be unblocked. In the theoretical case when the next waiter
never joins, we risk stalling indefinitely.
This can only happen for ABBA deadlocks, since entry into the wait queue
is guarded with AA checks. A precise sequence of executions leading up
to this scenario can be:
CPU 0 holds lock A.
CPU 1 holds lock B.
CPU 2 attempts lock B, becomes the pending waiter for B.
CPU 0 attempts lock B. B has locked+pending bits set, thus CPU 0 queues.
CPU 1 attempts lock A.
CPU 0 detects an ABBA deadlock.
Once deadlock detection happens for CPU 0, it will sit waiting for the
next waiter in the queue to populate node->next, which will experience
delays until such a waiter arrives.
Fix this by adjusting the logic for the check for deadlocks preceding
the waitq_timeout label. It would make sense to consolidate code for
both cases and use 'ret' to distinguish the value being propagated, but
that is left as an exercise for a future refactoring task to avoid diff
noise in this patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/ism: Fix UAF of sba and ieq during ism_dev_exit()
A ism interrupt handler can be active in parallel with ism_dev_exit(),
accessing freed data structures.
No new interrupts will be generated after unregister_ieq(). Drain ongoing
interrupt handlers by free_irq(), before freeing ism data structures. |
