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Search Results (85973 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72190 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix mrec_lock ABBA deadlock in rename ntfs_file_fsync(), ntfs_dir_fsync() and __ntfs_write_inode() lock an inode's mrec_lock before taking the mrec_lock of its parent directory. ntfs_rename() takes old_ni->mrec_lock and old_dir_ni->mrec_lock before taking new_ni->mrec_lock for an existing target, or new_dir_ni->mrec_lock for a cross-directory rename. This can deadlock when ntfs_file_fsync() or __ntfs_write_inode() holds the target inode, or when ntfs_dir_fsync() holds a child target directory, while rename() holds the parent directory and waits for the target. Fix this by locking the existing target inode before taking any parent directory mrec_lock. For cross-directory renames where the target parent is a descendant of the source parent, lock the target parent before the source parent so the directory order matches the child-to-parent order used by ntfs_file_fsync(), ntfs_dir_fsync(), and __ntfs_write_inode(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72192 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head indx_insert_into_root() promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into $INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into a newly allocated INDEX_BUFFER via hdr_insert_head(). The source byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes from root->index_block_size (via indx->index_bits). A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but shrinks root->index_block_size down to 512 after the root has been populated makes hdr_insert_head() memcpy attacker-controlled resident entry bytes past the end of the kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits) allocation returned by indx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are fully attacker-controlled. The write is reachable from unprivileged open(O_CREAT) on a mounted crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and triggers the copy. This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a kmalloc(index_block_size) allocation, with attacker-controlled content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout. Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's INDEX_HDR already reports hdr_total (the payload capacity of the new buffer) and hdr_used (the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry installed by indx_new()); require that to_move fits in the remaining payload before calling hdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with -EINVAL and mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding validation in this function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: avoid heap allocation for free-cluster readahead state get_nr_free_clusters() allocates a temporary file_ra_state before it publishes the precomputed free cluster count, sets NVolFreeClusterKnown(), and wakes vol->free_waitq. If that allocation fails, the worker returns without setting the flag or waking waiters, so callers waiting for the free count can block indefinitely. The readahead state is only used synchronously while scanning the bitmap. Keep it on the stack and pass it by address to the readahead helper. This eliminates the early allocation failure path instead of adding a special case that publishes a conservative count and wakes the waitqueue. Zero-initialize the on-stack state because file_ra_state_init() only sets ra_pages and prev_pos. Apply the same treatment to __get_nr_free_mft_records(), which scans the MFT bitmap with the same short-lived readahead state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72207 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: not change 0-byte $DATA attribute to non-resident When ntfs_resident_attr_resize() cannot grow a resident attribute in place, it retries after converting other resident attributes to non-resident to free space in the MFT recrord. Do not select zero-length resident $DATA attributes for this conversion. fsck treats 0-byte non-resident $DATA attribute as corruptions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72212 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory_hotplug: fix incorrect altmap passing in error path In create_altmaps_and_memory_blocks(), when arch_add_memory() succeeds with memmap_on_memory enabled, the vmemmap pages are allocated from params.altmap. If create_memory_block_devices() subsequently fails, the error path calls arch_remove_memory() with a NULL altmap instead of params.altmap. This is a bug that could lead to memory corruption. Since altmap is NULL, vmemmap_free() falls back to freeing the vmemmap pages into the system buddy allocator via free_pages() instead of the altmap. arch_remove_memory() then immediately destroys the physical linear mapping for this memory. This injects unowned pages into the buddy allocator, causing machine checks or memory corruption if the system later attempts to allocate and use those freed pages. Fix this by passing params.altmap to arch_remove_memory() in the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72214 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: cpcap-battery: Fix missing nvmem_device_put() causing reference leak In cpcap_battery_detect_battery_type(), the reference to an nvmem device obtained via nvmem_device_find() is not released with nvmem_device_put() on the success or read-failure paths, causing a permanent reference leak. The driver’s retry logic on subsequent battery property reads can compound this leak, preventing the nvmem device from ever being freed. Found by code review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72378 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix error code in afs_extract_vl_addrs() The error codes on these paths are only set on the first iteration through the loop. Set the correct error code on every iteration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72252 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: don't leak bad clone into future transaction On memory allocation failure the cloned nft_pipapo_match can enter a bad state: - some fields can have their lookup tables resized while others did not - bits might have been toggled - scratch map can be undersized which also means m->bsize_max can be lower than what is required This means that the next insertion in the same batch can trigger out-of-bounds writes. Furthermore, a failure in the first can result in the bad clone to leak into the next transaction because the abort callback is never executed in this case (the upper layer saw an error and no attempt to allocate a transactional request was made). Record a state for the nft_pipapo_match structure: - NEW (pristine clone) - MOD (modified clone with good state) - ERR (potentially bogus content) Then make it so that deletes and insertions fail when the clone entered ERR state. In case the very first insert attempt results in an error, free the clone right away. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72428 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with (slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE. The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a 4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization. Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses when updating slot_type[]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72290 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: Fix GISC refcount leak on AIF enable failure kvm_s390_gisc_register() registers the guest ISC before pinning the guest interrupt forwarding pages and allocating the AISB bit. If any of the later setup steps fails, the function unwinds the pinned pages and other local state, but does not unregister the GISC reference. Add the missing kvm_s390_gisc_unregister() to the error unwind path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72291 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix unlikely race in try_get_locked_pte() Fix an unlikely race in try_get_locked_pte(), which could have happened if puds or pmds get unmapped between the p?dp_get() and p?d_offset() functions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72303 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Validate notification payload size Validate MODULE_NOTIFICATION payload length before reading bytes/channel data in control update handling. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: flow_dissector: check device type before reading ETH_ADDRS __skb_flow_dissect() unconditionally reads 12 bytes from eth_hdr(skb) when FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS is requested. This assumes the skb has a valid Ethernet header at mac_header, which is not always the case. The problem can be triggered by: 1. Creating a TUN device in L3 mode (IFF_TUN, hard_header_len=0) 2. Attaching a multiq qdisc with a flower filter matching on eth_src 3. Sending a packet through AF_PACKET Since TUN in L3 mode has no link-layer header, mac_header points to the L3 data area. The flow dissector reads 12 bytes of uninitialized skb memory, which then propagates through fl_set_masked_key() and is used as a rhashtable lookup key in __fl_lookup(), as reported by KMSAN. Rejecting the filter in the control path (at tc filter add time) is not feasible because TC filter blocks can be shared between arbitrary devices -- a filter installed on an Ethernet device may later classify packets on a headerless device through a shared block. The device association is not fixed at filter creation time. Fix this by gating the memcpy on dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER, which ensures only true Ethernet-framed packets have their addresses read. This is more precise than the previous hard_header_len >= 12 check, which would incorrectly pass for non-Ethernet link types like IPoIB (ARPHRD_INFINIBAND, hard_header_len=24) and FDDI (hard_header_len=21) whose L2 headers are not in Ethernet format. Additionally check skb_mac_header_was_set() to guard against the pathological case where mac_header is the unset sentinel (~0U), which would cause eth_hdr() to return a wild pointer. For the act_mirred redirect case (Ethernet packet redirected to a non-Ethernet device sharing a TC block), zeroing the key is the correct behavior: the packet is now being classified on the target device, where Ethernet address matching is not semantically meaningful. Note: on non-Ethernet devices, the zeroed key will match a filter configured with all-zero MAC addresses. This is an improvement over the previous behavior where uninitialized memory could randomly match any filter. | ||||
| CVE-2026-19905 | 1 Jinher | 1 Oa | 2026-08-15 | 7.3 High |
| A weakness has been identified in Jinher OA 1.0. Impacted is an unknown function of the file /C6/JHSoft.Web.HrmAttendance/attendance_out_approve.aspx. This manipulation of the argument httpOID causes sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72340 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72343 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch: - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create(). - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch. Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle. This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72357 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uprobes/x86: Use proper mm_struct in __in_uprobe_trampoline In the unregister path we use __in_uprobe_trampoline check with current->mm for the VMA lookup, which is wrong, because we are in the tracer context, not the traced process. Add mm_struct pointer argument to __in_uprobe_trampoline and changing related callers to pass proper mm_struct pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72379 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: refuse O_TMPFILE creation with an unmapped fsuid or fsgid vfs_tmpfile() never checked that the caller's fsuid and fsgid map into the filesystem. On an idmapped mount whose idmapping does not cover the caller's fs{u,g}id, the ->tmpfile() instance initializes the new inode through inode_init_owner(), where mapped_fsuid()/mapped_fsgid() return INVALID_UID/INVALID_GID, and the tmpfile ends up owned by (uid_t)-1. Every other creation path already refuses this: may_o_create() (O_CREAT) and may_create_dentry() (mkdir, mknod, symlink, link) bail out with -EOVERFLOW via fsuidgid_has_mapping() precisely so that an object cannot be created with an owner the filesystem cannot represent. An O_TMPFILE is no exception: it is created I_LINKABLE and linkat(2) can splice it into the namespace afterwards, so the same guarantee must hold. Add the missing fsuidgid_has_mapping() check to vfs_tmpfile(). On a non-idmapped mount the caller's fs{u,g}id always map in the superblock's user namespace, so this is a no-op there and only takes effect on an idmapped mount that does not map the caller. It applies to every filesystem that sets FS_ALLOW_IDMAP and implements ->tmpfile() (tmpfs, ext4, btrfs, xfs, f2fs, ...), and to overlayfs, whose upper-layer tmpfile creation funnels through vfs_tmpfile() via backing_tmpfile_open(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72380 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[] pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation. req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single bound covers both ends. A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()). The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74255 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix UAF in tipc_l2_send_msg() Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free in ipvlan_hard_header() when called from tipc_l2_send_msg(). The root cause is that tipc_disable_l2_media() calls synchronize_net() while b->media_ptr is still valid. This allows concurrent RCU readers to obtain the device pointer after synchronize_net() has finished. The pointer is cleared later in bearer_disable(), but without any subsequent synchronization, allowing the device to be freed while still in use by readers. Fix this by clearing b->media_ptr in tipc_disable_l2_media() before calling synchronize_net(). This is safe to do now because the call order in bearer_disable() was reversed in 0d051bf93c06 ("tipc: make bearer packet filtering generic") to call tipc_node_delete_links() (which needs the pointer) before disable_media(). https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a2c1007.428ffe26.258b27.015d.GAE@google.com/T/#u | ||||