| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length
ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the
common information length for all known MLE types. However,
ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe
Request, and TDLS MLEs.
Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the
minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the
advertised common information length.
Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate
the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep
unknown-type handling unchanged.
[remove now misleading comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reset: sunxi: fix memory region leak on ioremap failure
In sunxi_reset_init(), when ioremap() fails, the memory region obtained
via request_mem_region() is not released, leading to a resource leak.
Add an err_mem_region label to properly release the memory region before
freeing the data structure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation
__ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may
reallocate skb->head. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
rtlbt_parse_firmware() copies patch_length - 4 bytes before appending the
firmware version. A malformed firmware patch shorter than the version field
can make this subtraction underflow and turn the copy into an oversized
read and write during Bluetooth setup.
The existing patch_offset + patch_length check can also wrap on 32-bit
architectures. Validate the patch length and range without arithmetic
overflow before allocating or copying the patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: mediatek: Fix possible nullptr KP in HWV cleanup/on-check
Should probe fail for HW_VOTER type power domains, this driver was
unconditionally trying to perform cleanup for DIRECT_CTL domains,
but only after checking if the target domain is powered on... with
the DIRECT_CTL scpsys_domain_is_on() code again.
And there's more: the scpsys_domain_is_on() function is also being
unconditionally used in the probe path, for any power domain that
has flag MTK_SCPD_KEEP_DEFAULT_OFF!
This bug was never experienced by anyone because the HWV domains
never failed probe, and because none of those is declared with the
aforementioned flag - but it's still something critical.
In order to fix this, add a check for MTCMOS Type and, based on
that, call the correct functions for an "is on" check, and also
do the same for the cleanup path, calling the correct functions
for the "power off" action.
For the latter, since there's a call to pm_genpd_remove() right
before calling power_off, be cautious and add a variation of the
power off functions (with a _internal suffix) for those to get a
pointer to scpsys_domain instead of one to generic_pm_domain as,
even if that's still working, this is way too much fragile and
would break at some point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx93-blk-ctrl: Extract PHY as shared domain for DSI/CSI
The MIPI DSI and CSI domains share control bits for clock and reset, which
can lead to incorrect behavior if one domain disables the shared resource
while the other is still active.
To fix the issue, introduce a shared MIPI PHY power domain to own the
common resources and make DSI and CSI its subdomains. This ensures the
shared bits are properly managed and not disabled while still in use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: rebind mm mempolicy to effective_mems, not mems_allowed
Creating a child cpuset where cpuset.mems is never set leads to a div/0
when a VMA mempolicy with MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES rebinds in response to a
CPU hotplug event.
Reproduction steps:
1) Create a cgroup w/ cpuset controls (do not set cpuset.mems)
2) Move the task into the child cpuset
3) Create a VMA mempolicy for that task with MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES
4) unplug and hotplug a cpu
echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
5) mempolicy rebind does a div/0 in mpol_relative_nodemask on the
call to __nodes_fold()
The cpuset code passes (cs->mems_allowed) which is not guaranteed to have
nodes to the rebind routine. Use cs->effective_mems instead, which is
guaranteed to have a non-empty nodemask once we reach that code path.
[ david: add a comment, slightly rephrase description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/diag: Add missing array_index_nospec() call to memtop_get_page_count()
'level' is user space controlled and used to read from an array. Add the
missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in machine_kexec_prepare()
A NULL pointer dereference issue is noticed in riscv's
machine_kexec_prepare(), where image->segment[i].buf might be NULL and
copied unchecked.
The NULL buf comes from ima_add_kexec_buffer(), where kbuf is added by
kexec_add_buffer(), but kbuf.buffer is NULL, then it is copied without
a check in machine_kexec_prepare():
kexec_file_load
-> kimage_file_alloc_init()
-> kimage_file_prepare_segments()
-> ima_add_kexec_buffer()
-> kexec_add_buffer()
-> machine_kexec_prepare()
-> memcpy()
Address this by adding a check before the data copy attempt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: ims-pcu - fix use-after-free and double-free in disconnect
ims_pcu_disconnect() only intended to perform cleanup when the primary
(control) interface is unbound. However, it currently relies on the
interface class to distinguish between control and data interfaces.
A malicious device could present a data interface with the same class
as the control interface, leading to premature cleanup and potential
use-after-free or double-free.
Switch to verifying that the interface being disconnected is indeed
the control interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: elx: efct: Fix refcount leak in efct_hw_io_abort()
When efct_hw_reqtag_alloc() fails in efct_hw_io_abort(), the error path
returns -ENOSPC without releasing the reference obtained via
kref_get_unless_zero() earlier in the function. All other error paths
correctly drop the reference. This causes a permanent reference leak on the
io_to_abort object.
Additionally, the abort_in_progress flag is left set to true on this path,
which means future abort attempts for the same I/O will immediately return
-EINPROGRESS even though the abort was never submitted, effectively
blocking recovery.
Fix this by adding the missing kref_put() call and reset abort_in_progress
to false, matching the cleanup done in the efct_hw_wq_write() failure path
below. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-buf: dma-fence: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
The commit mentioned in the fixes tag below introduced a mechanism
through which fence producers can fully decouple from fence consumers.
This, desirable, mechanism is based on the fence's signaled-bit as the
"decoupling point".
A sophisticated interaction between RCU and atomic instructions attempts
to ensure that fence consumers can still interact with fence producers
through the dma_fence_ops (callback pointers into the producer).
This is the desired behavior: to check for decoupling, the signaled-bit
is first checked. If it's not yet signaled, RCU ensures that the ops
pointer cannot yet be NULL.
Hereby, dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() first sets the signaled-bit,
and then sets the ops pointer to NULL. Readers first load the ops
pointer, and then check through the signaled-bit whether the pointer can
legally be accessed.
These set and load operations could occur out of order on weakly ordered
platforms. This problem can be solved very elegantly by using the ops
pointer itself as the synchronization point. The pointer is either NULL,
or cannot become NULL while it is being used thanks to RCU.
Replace the signaled-bit check in dma_fence_timeline_name() and
dma_fence_driver_name(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file
The refactoring in commit a28d893eb327 ("md: port block device access to file")
accidentally causes the caller's thread keyring to be kept alive long
beyond the caller's lifetime.
As a result, "cryptsetup luksSuspend" silently fails to wipe the
LUKS volume key from memory.
In detail: "cryptsetup luksOpen" uses its supposedly ephemeral thread
keyring to pass the volume key to the kernel. dm-crypt's
crypt_set_keyring_key() copies the key material into its own
crypt_config structure and then drops its own reference to the key in
the keyring with key_put().
With this fix, restoring pre-v6.9 behavior, the copy in the thread
keyring is then promptly garbage collected, such that exactly one copy
of the volume key remains. This single copy is correctly wiped from
memory on "cryptsetup luksSuspend".
Without this fix, the thread keyring and the volume key in it remains.
This second copy is only freed on "luksClose". "luksSuspend" neither
knows about this copy nor has any way to remove it, so the key remains
recoverable from RAM after a suspend that is documented to have wiped it.
This fix should not introduce new security problems, as the code is
anyway gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The device-mapper core, not the calling
task, is the legitimate owner of this long-lived file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values
KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be
overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content
while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler()
run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.
Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter
(nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new
per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX
handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the
lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.
hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since
bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a
running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.
Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the
stored reply frame's can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the
frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler()
could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that
normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged
buffer for updates, directly on op->frames pre-registration for new
ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.
bcm_rx_handler()'s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected
snapshot of op->flags before deciding whether to call bcm_can_tx(),
but does not hold the lock across that call.
Also take a lock-protected snapshot of the currframe in bcm_can_tx()
to avoid partly overwrites by content updates in bcm_tx_setup().
Finally check if a TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX/SETTIMER might have reset
op->currframe between the two locked sections in bcm_can_tx().
Omit calling hrtimer_forward() with zero interval in bcm_rx_thr_handler().
kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() before it
cancels this timer, so check kt_ival2 inside the bcm_rx_update_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: tegra: Fix burst size calculation
Currently, the Tegra GPC DMA hardware requires the transfer length to
be a multiple of the max burst size configured for the channel. When a
client requests a transfer where the length is not evenly divisible by
the configured max burst size, the DMA hangs with partial burst at
the end.
Fix this by reducing the burst size to the largest power-of-2 value
that evenly divides the transfer length. For example, a 40-byte
transfer with a 16-byte max burst will now use an 8-byte burst
(40 / 8 = 5 complete bursts) instead of causing a hang.
This issue was observed with the PL011 UART driver where TX DMA
transfers of arbitrary lengths were stuck. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/monwriter: Reject buffer reuse with different data length
When data buffers are reused, e.g. for interval sample records, the
first record determines the data length, and the size of the buffer for
user copy. Current monwriter code does not check if the data length was
changed for subsequent records, which also would never happen for valid
user programs.
However, a malicious user could change the data length, resulting in out
of bounds user copy to the kernel buffer, and memory corruption. By
default, the monwriter misc device is created with root-only permissions,
so practical impact is typically low.
Fix this by checking for changed data length and rejecting such records. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: probes: save original sp in rethook trampoline
Reading a word from the stack in a kretprobe crashes a risc-v kernel.
$ cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
$ echo 'r n_tty_write $stack0' > dynamic_events
$ echo 1 > events/kprobes/enable
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000200000128
...
[<ffffffff80016d16>] regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0x26/0x38
[<ffffffff80177196>] process_fetch_insn+0x3ee/0x760
[<ffffffff80177836>] kretprobe_trace_func+0x116/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8017795a>] kretprobe_dispatcher+0x4a/0x58
[<ffffffff8013572e>] kretprobe_rethook_handler+0x5e/0x90
[<ffffffff80180838>] rethook_trampoline_handler+0x70/0x108
[<ffffffff8001ba32>] arch_rethook_trampoline_callback+0x12/0x1c
[<ffffffff8001ba84>] arch_rethook_trampoline+0x48/0x94
[<ffffffff8067872a>] tty_write+0x1a/0x30
In regs_get_kernel_stack_nth, regs->sp contains an arbitrary value.
arch_rethook_trampoline saves the registers from the probed function in a
struct pt_regs. sp is not saved. Instead, sp is decremented for
arch_rethook_trampoline's local stack.
Fix this crash and save the original sp along with the other registers.
Use a0 as a temporary register, it is overwritten anyway.
[pjw@kernel.org: added Fixes tag; cc'ed stable] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libata-core: Reject an invalid concurrent positioning ranges count
ata_dev_config_cpr() takes the number of range descriptors from buf[0]
of the concurrent positioning ranges log (up to 255), which the device
reports independently of the log size in the GPL directory. The count is
then walked at a fixed 32-byte stride in two places with no bound: the
log read here, and the INQUIRY VPD page B9h emitter, which writes one
descriptor per range into the fixed 2048-byte ata_scsi_rbuf. A device
reporting a count larger than its own log overflows the read buffer (up
to 7704 bytes past a 512-byte slab), and a count above 62 overflows the
response buffer on the emit side.
Bound the count once, on probe, against both the log the device returned
and the number of descriptors the VPD B9h response buffer can hold
(ATA_DEV_MAX_CPR, derived from the rbuf size). Reject an out-of-range
count with a warning; this keeps the emitter in bounds with no separate
change there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but
stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small
value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry,
reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses
the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then
rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_taprio: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked
When taprio's software path peeks a non-work-conserving child qdisc, the
child stashes the peeked skb in its gso_skb; taprio_dequeue_from_txq()
then takes the packet with a direct child ->dequeue() call, which ignores
that stash, orphans the peeked skb and desyncs the child's qlen/backlog.
With a qfq child this re-enters the child on an emptied list and
dereferences NULL, panicking the kernel from softirq on ordinary egress.
Take the packet through qdisc_dequeue_peeked(), as sch_red and sch_sfb
now do. The helper returns the child's stashed skb first and is a no-op
when there is none, so a work-conserving child is unaffected and the
gated path now consumes the skb whose length was charged to the budget. |
