| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: check that offset is within bounds in get_config()
This condition checks "len" but it does not check "offset" and that
could result in an out of bounds read if "offset > dev->config_size".
The problem is that since both variables are unsigned the
"dev->config_size - offset" subtraction would result in a very high
unsigned value.
I think these checks might not be necessary because "len" and "offset"
are supposed to already have been validated using the
vhost_vdpa_config_validate() function. But I do not know the code
perfectly, and I like to be safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup
KASAN reports an out-of-bounds read in rk_gmac_setup on the line:
while (ops->regs[i]) {
This happens for most platforms since the regs flexible array member is
empty, so the memory after the ops structure is being read here. It
seems that mostly this happens to contain zero anyway, so we get lucky
and everything still works.
To avoid adding redundant data to nearly all the ops structures, add a
new flag to indicate whether the regs field is valid and avoid this loop
when it is not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: tmc-etf: Fix global-out-of-bounds in tmc_update_etf_buffer()
commit 6f755e85c332 ("coresight: Add helper for inserting synchronization
packets") removed trailing '\0' from barrier_pkt array and updated the
call sites like etb_update_buffer() to have proper checks for barrier_pkt
size before read but missed updating tmc_update_etf_buffer() which still
reads barrier_pkt past the array size resulting in KASAN out-of-bounds
bug. Fix this by adding a check for barrier_pkt size before accessing
like it is done in etb_update_buffer().
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in tmc_update_etf_buffer+0x4b8/0x698
Read of size 4 at addr ffffffd05b7d1030 by task perf/2629
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x27c
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0x11c/0x188
print_address_description+0x3c/0x4a4
__kasan_report+0x140/0x164
kasan_report+0x10/0x18
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24
tmc_update_etf_buffer+0x4b8/0x698
etm_event_stop+0x248/0x2d8
etm_event_del+0x20/0x2c
event_sched_out+0x214/0x6f0
group_sched_out+0xd0/0x270
ctx_sched_out+0x2ec/0x518
__perf_event_task_sched_out+0x4fc/0xe6c
__schedule+0x1094/0x16a0
preempt_schedule_irq+0x88/0x170
arm64_preempt_schedule_irq+0xf0/0x18c
el1_irq+0xe8/0x180
perf_event_exec+0x4d8/0x56c
setup_new_exec+0x204/0x400
load_elf_binary+0x72c/0x18c0
search_binary_handler+0x13c/0x420
load_script+0x500/0x6c4
search_binary_handler+0x13c/0x420
exec_binprm+0x118/0x654
__do_execve_file+0x77c/0xba4
__arm64_compat_sys_execve+0x98/0xac
el0_svc_common+0x1f8/0x5e0
el0_svc_compat_handler+0x84/0xb0
el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x50
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
barrier_pkt+0x10/0x40
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffd05b7d0f00: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
ffffffd05b7d0f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffd05b7d1000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 03
^
ffffffd05b7d1080: fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa fa 03 fa fa fa
ffffffd05b7d1100: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
================================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf()
Fix an 11-year old bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() while
addressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds:
arch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]
arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of
data into a one-byte size member _config_ of the wrong structue
FW_CONFIGURE_BUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a
legitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length
of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right
structure is FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS, instead, because it contains
6 more members apart from the header _hdr_. Also, the name of
the function ngene_command_config_free_buf() suggests that the actual
intention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers
(which takes place in the function ngene_command_config_buf(), above).
Fix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS
into new struct config, and use &com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as
the destination address, instead of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config,
when calling memcpy().
This also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable
-Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the
FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: core: Validate channel ID when processing command completions
MHI reads the channel ID from the event ring element sent by the
device which can be any value between 0 and 255. In order to
prevent any out of bound accesses, add a check against the maximum
number of channels supported by the controller and those channels
not configured yet so as to skip processing of that event ring
element. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sch_cake: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options and header
The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and
cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length
is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the
opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads
one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
v2 changes:
Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP
header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was
allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP
header if doff was smaller than 5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxgb4: avoid accessing registers when clearing filters
Hardware register having the server TID base can contain
invalid values when adapter is in bad state (for example,
due to AER fatal error). Reading these invalid values in the
register can lead to out-of-bound memory access. So, fix
by using the saved server TID base when clearing filters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix possible AOOB issue in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report
Fix possible array out of bound access in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report.
Remove unnecessary varibable in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: marvell: prestera: fix incorrect structure access
In line:
upper = info->upper_dev;
We access upper_dev field, which is related only for particular events
(e.g. event == NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER). So, this line cause invalid memory
access for another events,
when ptr is not netdev_notifier_changeupper_info.
The KASAN logs are as follows:
[ 30.123165] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in prestera_netdev_port_event.constprop.0+0x68/0x538 [prestera]
[ 30.133336] Read of size 8 at addr ffff80000cf772b0 by task udevd/778
[ 30.139866]
[ 30.141398] CPU: 0 PID: 778 Comm: udevd Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3 #6
[ 30.147588] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT)
[ 30.153056] Call trace:
[ 30.155547] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2c0
[ 30.159320] show_stack+0x18/0x30
[ 30.162729] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 30.166491] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8
[ 30.172346] kasan_report+0x1e8/0x250
[ 30.176102] __asan_load8+0x98/0xe0
[ 30.179682] prestera_netdev_port_event.constprop.0+0x68/0x538 [prestera]
[ 30.186847] prestera_netdev_event_handler+0x1b4/0x1c0 [prestera]
[ 30.193313] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x74/0xa0
[ 30.197860] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x68/0xc0
[ 30.202924] register_netdevice+0x3cc/0x760
[ 30.207190] register_netdev+0x24/0x50
[ 30.211015] prestera_device_register+0x8a0/0xba0 [prestera] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elantech - fix stack out of bound access in elantech_change_report_id()
The array param[] in elantech_change_report_id() must be at least 3
bytes, because elantech_read_reg_params() is calling ps2_command() with
PSMOUSE_CMD_GETINFO, that is going to access 3 bytes from param[], but
it's defined in the stack as an array of 2 bytes, therefore we have a
potential stack out-of-bounds access here, also confirmed by KASAN:
[ 6.512374] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0
[ 6.512397] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881024d77c2 by task kworker/2:1/118
[ 6.512416] CPU: 2 PID: 118 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.13.0-22-generic #22+arighi20211110
[ 6.512428] Hardware name: LENOVO 20T8000QGE/20T8000QGE, BIOS R1AET32W (1.08 ) 08/14/2020
[ 6.512436] Workqueue: events_long serio_handle_event
[ 6.512453] Call Trace:
[ 6.512462] show_stack+0x52/0x58
[ 6.512474] dump_stack+0xa1/0xd3
[ 6.512487] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x140
[ 6.512502] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0
[ 6.512516] __kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x112
[ 6.512527] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x20/0xd0
[ 6.512539] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0
[ 6.512552] kasan_report+0x3c/0x50
[ 6.512564] __asan_load1+0x6a/0x70
[ 6.512575] __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0
[ 6.512589] ? ps2_drain+0x240/0x240
[ 6.512601] ? dev_printk_emit+0xa2/0xd3
[ 6.512612] ? dev_vprintk_emit+0xc5/0xc5
[ 6.512621] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 6.512634] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0
[ 6.512643] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20
[ 6.512655] ps2_command+0x52/0x90
[ 6.512670] elantech_ps2_command+0x4f/0xc0 [psmouse]
[ 6.512734] elantech_change_report_id+0x1e6/0x256 [psmouse]
[ 6.512799] ? elantech_report_trackpoint.constprop.0.cold+0xd/0xd [psmouse]
[ 6.512863] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90
[ 6.512877] elantech_query_info.cold+0x6bd/0x9ed [psmouse]
[ 6.512943] ? elantech_setup_ps2+0x460/0x460 [psmouse]
[ 6.513005] ? psmouse_reset+0x69/0xb0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513064] ? psmouse_attr_set_helper+0x2a0/0x2a0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513122] ? phys_pmd_init+0x30e/0x521
[ 6.513137] elantech_init+0x8a/0x200 [psmouse]
[ 6.513200] ? elantech_init_ps2+0xf0/0xf0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513249] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse]
[ 6.513296] ? synaptics_send_cmd+0x60/0x60 [psmouse]
[ 6.513342] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse]
[ 6.513388] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x11e/0x170 [psmouse]
[ 6.513432] psmouse_extensions+0x65d/0x6e0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513476] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x170/0x170 [psmouse]
[ 6.513519] ? mutex_unlock+0x22/0x40
[ 6.513526] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90
[ 6.513536] ? psmouse_probe+0xa3/0xf0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513580] psmouse_switch_protocol+0x27d/0x2e0 [psmouse]
[ 6.513624] psmouse_connect+0x272/0x530 [psmouse]
[ 6.513669] serio_driver_probe+0x55/0x70
[ 6.513679] really_probe+0x190/0x720
[ 6.513689] driver_probe_device+0x160/0x1f0
[ 6.513697] device_driver_attach+0x119/0x130
[ 6.513705] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130
[ 6.513713] __driver_attach+0xe7/0x1a0
[ 6.513720] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130
[ 6.513728] bus_for_each_dev+0xfb/0x150
[ 6.513738] ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[ 6.513748] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x30/0x30
[ 6.513757] driver_attach+0x2d/0x40
[ 6.513764] serio_handle_event+0x199/0x3d0
[ 6.513775] process_one_work+0x471/0x740
[ 6.513785] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x790
[ 6.513794] ? process_one_work+0x740/0x740
[ 6.513802] kthread+0x1b4/0x1e0
[ 6.513809] ? set_kthread_struct+0x80/0x80
[ 6.513816] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 6.513832] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 6.513838] page:00000000bc35e189 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1024d7
[ 6.513847] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 6.513860] raw: 0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in load_balance()
Syzbot reported a handful of occurrences where an sd->nr_balance_failed can
grow to much higher values than one would expect.
A successful load_balance() resets it to 0; a failed one increments
it. Once it gets to sd->cache_nice_tries + 3, this *should* trigger an
active balance, which will either set it to sd->cache_nice_tries+1 or reset
it to 0. However, in case the to-be-active-balanced task is not allowed to
run on env->dst_cpu, then the increment is done without any further
modification.
This could then be repeated ad nauseam, and would explain the absurdly high
values reported by syzbot (86, 149). VincentG noted there is value in
letting sd->cache_nice_tries grow, so the shift itself should be
fixed. That means preventing:
"""
If the value of the right operand is negative or is greater than or equal
to the width of the promoted left operand, the behavior is undefined.
"""
Thus we need to cap the shift exponent to
BITS_PER_TYPE(typeof(lefthand)) - 1.
I had a look around for other similar cases via coccinelle:
@expr@
position pos;
expression E1;
expression E2;
@@
(
E1 >> E2@pos
|
E1 >> E2@pos
)
@cst depends on expr@
position pos;
expression expr.E1;
constant cst;
@@
(
E1 >> cst@pos
|
E1 << cst@pos
)
@script:python depends on !cst@
pos << expr.pos;
exp << expr.E2;
@@
# Dirty hack to ignore constexpr
if exp.upper() != exp:
coccilib.report.print_report(pos[0], "Possible UB shift here")
The only other match in kernel/sched is rq_clock_thermal() which employs
sched_thermal_decay_shift, and that exponent is already capped to 10, so
that one is fine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ataflop: potential out of bounds in do_format()
The function uses "type" as an array index:
q = unit[drive].disk[type]->queue;
Unfortunately the bounds check on "type" isn't done until later in the
function. Fix this by moving the bounds check to the start. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kyber: fix out of bounds access when preempted
__blk_mq_sched_bio_merge() gets the ctx and hctx for the current CPU and
passes the hctx to ->bio_merge(). kyber_bio_merge() then gets the ctx
for the current CPU again and uses that to get the corresponding Kyber
context in the passed hctx. However, the thread may be preempted between
the two calls to blk_mq_get_ctx(), and the ctx returned the second time
may no longer correspond to the passed hctx. This "works" accidentally
most of the time, but it can cause us to read garbage if the second ctx
came from an hctx with more ctx's than the first one (i.e., if
ctx->index_hw[hctx->type] > hctx->nr_ctx).
This manifested as this UBSAN array index out of bounds error reported
by Jakub:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:130:9
index 13106 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [128]'
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xa4/0xe5
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold.13+0x2a/0x34
queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x476/0x480
do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c2/0x1d0
kyber_bio_merge+0x112/0x180
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1f5/0x1100
submit_bio_noacct+0x7b0/0x870
submit_bio+0xc2/0x3a0
btrfs_map_bio+0x4f0/0x9d0
btrfs_submit_data_bio+0x24e/0x310
submit_one_bio+0x7f/0xb0
submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x440
__extent_writepage_io+0x2b8/0x5e0
__extent_writepage+0x28d/0x6e0
extent_write_cache_pages+0x4d7/0x7a0
extent_writepages+0xa2/0x110
do_writepages+0x8f/0x180
__writeback_single_inode+0x99/0x7f0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x34e/0x790
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x9e/0x120
wb_writeback+0x4d2/0x660
wb_workfn+0x64d/0xa10
process_one_work+0x53a/0xa80
worker_thread+0x69/0x5b0
kthread+0x20b/0x240
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Only Kyber uses the hctx, so fix it by passing the request_queue to
->bio_merge() instead. BFQ and mq-deadline just use that, and Kyber can
map the queues itself to avoid the mismatch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Retrieve all the PDOs instead of just the first 4
commit 4dbc6a4ef06d ("usb: typec: ucsi: save power data objects
in PD mode") introduced retrieval of the PDOs when connected to a
PD-capable source. But only the first 4 PDOs are received since
that is the maximum number that can be fetched at a time given the
MESSAGE_IN length limitation (16 bytes). However, as per the PD spec
a connected source may advertise up to a maximum of 7 PDOs.
If such a source is connected it's possible the PPM could have
negotiated a power contract with one of the PDOs at index greater
than 4, and would be reflected in the request data object's (RDO)
object position field. This would result in an out-of-bounds access
when the rdo_index() is used to index into the src_pdos array in
ucsi_psy_get_voltage_now().
With the help of the UBSAN -fsanitize=array-bounds checker enabled
this exact issue is revealed when connecting to a PD source adapter
that advertise 5 PDOs and the PPM enters a contract having selected
the 5th one.
[ 151.545106][ T70] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 151.545112][ T70] Internal error: BRK handler: f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[ 151.545499][ T70] pc : ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[ 151.545507][ T70] lr : power_supply_show_property+0xc0/0x328
...
[ 151.545542][ T70] Call trace:
[ 151.545544][ T70] ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[ 151.545546][ T70] power_supply_uevent+0x1a4/0x2f0
[ 151.545550][ T70] dev_uevent+0x200/0x384
[ 151.545555][ T70] kobject_uevent_env+0x1d4/0x7e8
[ 151.545557][ T70] power_supply_changed_work+0x174/0x31c
[ 151.545562][ T70] process_one_work+0x244/0x6f0
[ 151.545564][ T70] worker_thread+0x3e0/0xa64
We can resolve this by instead retrieving and storing up to the
maximum of 7 PDOs in the con->src_pdos array. This would involve
two calls to the GET_PDOS command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: physmap: physmap-bt1-rom: Fix unintentional stack access
Cast &data to (char *) in order to avoid unintentionally accessing
the stack.
Notice that data is of type u32, so any increment to &data
will be in the order of 4-byte chunks, and this piece of code
is actually intended to be a byte offset.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1497765 ("Out-of-bounds access") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947
CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
__netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
__napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
__do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
do_softirq+0x71/0x90
</IRQ>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
__ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
__sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
>ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
^
ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2
for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()
the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fs_context: validate UDP retrans to prevent shift out-of-bounds
Fix shift out-of-bounds in xprt_calc_majortimeo(). This is caused
by a garbage timeout (retrans) mount option being passed to nfs mount,
in this case from syzkaller.
If the protocol is XPRT_TRANSPORT_UDP, then 'retrans' is a shift
value for a 64-bit long integer, so 'retrans' cannot be >= 64.
If it is >= 64, fail the mount and return an error. |
| Microsoft Message Queuing Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Message Queuing Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Common Log File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
