| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: Clear napi->skb before dev_kfree_skb_any()
gve_rx_free_skb incorrectly leaves napi->skb referencing an skb after it
is freed with dev_kfree_skb_any(). This can result in a subsequent call
to napi_get_frags returning a dangling pointer.
Fix this by clearing napi->skb before the skb is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become
invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or
skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later
call to skb_gso_segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: keep DMA buffers required for suspend/resume
Nouveau deallocates a few buffers post GPU init which are required for GPU suspend/resume to function correctly.
This is likely not as big an issue on systems where the NVGPU is the only GPU, but on multi-GPU set ups it leads to a regression where the kernel module errors and results in a system-wide rendering freeze.
This commit addresses that regression by moving the two buffers required for suspend and resume to be deallocated at driver unload instead of post init. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Both cadence-quadspi ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume()
implementations start with:
struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
This obviously cannot be correct, unless "struct cqspi_st" is the
first member of " struct spi_controller", or the other way around, but
it is not the case. "struct spi_controller" is allocated by
devm_spi_alloc_host(), which allocates an extra amount of memory for
private data, used to store "struct cqspi_st".
The ->probe() function of the cadence-quadspi driver then sets the
device drvdata to store the address of the "struct cqspi_st"
structure. Therefore:
struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
is correct, but:
struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
is not, as it makes "host" point not to a "struct spi_controller" but
to the same "struct cqspi_st" structure as above.
This obviously leads to bad things (memory corruption, kernel crashes)
directly during ->probe(), as ->probe() enables the device using PM
runtime, leading the ->runtime_resume() hook being called, which in
turns calls spi_controller_resume() with the wrong pointer.
This has at least been reported [0] to cause a kernel crash, but the
exact behavior will depend on the memory contents.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240226121803.5a7r5wkpbbowcxgx@dhruva/
This issue potentially affects all platforms that are currently using
the cadence-quadspi driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: Fix uninitialized pointer dmactl
In the case where __lpass_get_dmactl_handle is called and the driver
id dai_id is invalid the pointer dmactl is not being assigned a value,
and dmactl contains a garbage value since it has not been initialized
and so the null check may not work. Fix this to initialize dmactl to
NULL. One could argue that modern compilers will set this to zero, but
it is useful to keep this initialized as per the same way in functions
__lpass_platform_codec_intf_init and lpass_cdc_dma_daiops_hw_params.
Cleans up clang scan build warning:
sound/soc/qcom/lpass-cdc-dma.c:275:7: warning: Branch condition
evaluates to a garbage value [core.uninitialized.Branch] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session
There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may
lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after
sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:
sess->session_info[i] = session_info;
if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data
structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is
accessed within amdtee_open_session().
The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in
amdtee_open_session(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: fix stuck flows on cleanup due to pending work
To clear the flow table on flow table free, the following sequence
normally happens in order:
1) gc_step work is stopped to disable any further stats/del requests.
2) All flow table entries are set to teardown state.
3) Run gc_step which will queue HW del work for each flow table entry.
4) Waiting for the above del work to finish (flush).
5) Run gc_step again, deleting all entries from the flow table.
6) Flow table is freed.
But if a flow table entry already has pending HW stats or HW add work
step 3 will not queue HW del work (it will be skipped), step 4 will wait
for the pending add/stats to finish, and step 5 will queue HW del work
which might execute after freeing of the flow table.
To fix the above, this patch flushes the pending work, then it sets the
teardown flag to all flows in the flowtable and it forces a garbage
collector run to queue work to remove the flows from hardware, then it
flushes this new pending work and (finally) it forces another garbage
collector run to remove the entry from the software flowtable.
Stack trace:
[47773.882335] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.883634] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888103b45aa8 by task kworker/u20:6/543704
[47773.885634] CPU: 3 PID: 543704 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[47773.886745] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009)
[47773.888438] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del flow_offload_work_handler [nf_flow_table]
[47773.889727] Call Trace:
[47773.890214] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[47773.890818] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140
[47773.892990] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[47773.894459] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[47773.895174] down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.899706] nf_flow_offload_tuple+0x24f/0x3c0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.907137] flow_offload_work_handler+0x72d/0xbe0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.913372] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[47773.921325]
[47773.921325] Allocated by task 592159:
[47773.922031] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.922730] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[47773.923411] tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x3cb/0x1230 [act_ct]
[47773.924363] tcf_ct_init+0x71c/0x1156 [act_ct]
[47773.925207] tcf_action_init_1+0x45b/0x700
[47773.925987] tcf_action_init+0x453/0x6b0
[47773.926692] tcf_exts_validate+0x3d0/0x600
[47773.927419] fl_change+0x757/0x4a51 [cls_flower]
[47773.928227] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070
[47773.936652]
[47773.936652] Freed by task 543704:
[47773.937303] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.938039] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[47773.938731] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[47773.939467] __kasan_slab_free+0xe7/0x120
[47773.940194] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x86/0x190
[47773.941038] kfree+0xce/0x3a0
[47773.941644] tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work
Original patch description and stack trace by Paul Blakey. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm btree remove: assign new_root only when removal succeeds
remove_raw() in dm_btree_remove() may fail due to IO read error
(e.g. read the content of origin block fails during shadowing),
and the value of shadow_spine::root is uninitialized, but
the uninitialized value is still assign to new_root in the
end of dm_btree_remove().
For dm-thin, the value of pmd->details_root or pmd->root will become
an uninitialized value, so if trying to read details_info tree again
out-of-bound memory may occur as showed below:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3fdcb14c8d7520
CPU: 4 PID: 515 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC
RIP: 0010:metadata_ll_load_ie+0x14/0x30
Call Trace:
sm_metadata_count_is_more_than_one+0xb9/0xe0
dm_tm_shadow_block+0x52/0x1c0
shadow_step+0x59/0xf0
remove_raw+0xb2/0x170
dm_btree_remove+0xf4/0x1c0
dm_pool_delete_thin_device+0xc3/0x140
pool_message+0x218/0x2b0
target_message+0x251/0x290
ctl_ioctl+0x1c4/0x4d0
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixing it by only assign new_root when removal succeeds |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix memory ordering between normal and ordered work functions
Ordered work functions aren't guaranteed to be handled by the same thread
which executed the normal work functions. The only way execution between
normal/ordered functions is synchronized is via the WORK_DONE_BIT,
unfortunately the used bitops don't guarantee any ordering whatsoever.
This manifested as seemingly inexplicable crashes on ARM64, where
async_chunk::inode is seen as non-null in async_cow_submit which causes
submit_compressed_extents to be called and crash occurs because
async_chunk::inode suddenly became NULL. The call trace was similar to:
pc : submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
lr : async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
sp : ffff800015d4bc20
<registers omitted for brevity>
Call trace:
submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
run_ordered_work+0xc8/0x280
btrfs_work_helper+0x98/0x250
process_one_work+0x1f0/0x4ac
worker_thread+0x188/0x504
kthread+0x110/0x114
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Fix this by adding respective barrier calls which ensure that all
accesses preceding setting of WORK_DONE_BIT are strictly ordered before
setting the flag. At the same time add a read barrier after reading of
WORK_DONE_BIT in run_ordered_work which ensures all subsequent loads
would be strictly ordered after reading the bit. This in turn ensures
are all accesses before WORK_DONE_BIT are going to be strictly ordered
before any access that can occur in ordered_func. |
| In JetBrains WebStorm before 2026.2 arbitrary code execution was possible before granting project trust via project-local package-manager tooling |
| In JetBrains WebStorm before 2026.2 arbitrary code execution was possible before granting project trust via the configured Node.js interpreter |
| In JetBrains WebStorm before 2026.2 arbitrary code execution was possible via a project-supplied linter configuration |
| Exim before 4.99.5 allows .forward privilege escalation because force_command for a pipe transport is mishandled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode()
If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf:
if (!mode_option) {
fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf);
mode_option = mode_option_buf;
}
Later, name is assigned from mode_option:
const char *name = mode_option;
However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used:
kfree(mode_option_buf);
while name is still accessed by:
if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) ||
Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a
use-after-free.
Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the
function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix UAF of struct file_lock in SMB2_LOCK deferred-lock cancellation
When a blocking byte-range lock request is deferred in the
FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED path, ksmbd registers the asynchronous work into
the connection's async_requests list via setup_async_work(). The cancel
callback smb2_remove_blocked_lock() holds a reference to the flock.
If the lock waiter is subsequently woken up but the work state is no
longer KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE (e.g., due to a concurrent cancellation), the
cleanup path calls locks_free_lock(flock) without dequeuing the work from
the async_requests list. Concurrently, smb2_cancel() walks the list
under conn->request_lock and invokes the cancel callback, which then
dereferences the already freed 'flock'. This leads to a slab-use-after-free
inside __wake_up_common.
Fix this by restructuring the cleanup logic after the worker returns
from ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_wait(). Move list_del(&smb_lock->llist) and
release_async_work(work) to the top of the cleanup block. This guarantees
that the async work is completely dequeued and serialized under
conn->request_lock before locks_free_lock(flock) is called, rendering
the flock unreachable for any concurrent smb2_cancel(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix use-after-free on remove
KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link()
during rmmod of imx8_isi:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650
Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000d47cb02a by task rmmod/724
Call trace:
__media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650
__media_entity_remove_links+0x78/0x144
__media_device_unregister_entity+0x150/0x280
media_device_unregister_entity+0x48/0x68
v4l2_device_unregister_subdev+0x158/0x300
v4l2_async_unbind_subdev_one+0x22c/0x358
v4l2_async_nf_unbind_all_subdevs+0xfc/0x1c0
v4l2_async_nf_unregister+0x5c/0x14c
mxc_isi_remove+0x124/0x2a0 [imx8_isi]
Allocated by task 249:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x27c/0x690
mxc_isi_crossbar_init+0x22c/0x560 [imx8_isi]
Freed by task 724:
kfree+0x1e4/0x5b0
mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup+0x34/0x80 [imx8_isi]
mxc_isi_remove+0x11c/0x2a0 [imx8_isi]
The problem is that mxc_isi_remove() calls mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup()
before mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup(). The crossbar cleanup frees the media
entity pads, but the subsequent v4l2 cleanup still tries to remove
media links that reference those pads.
Fix this by calling mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup() before
mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() to ensure all media entities are properly
unregistered while the pads are still valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: misc: usbio: fix disconnect UAF in client teardown
usbio_disconnect() walks usbio->cli_list in reverse and uninitializes each
auxiliary device. auxiliary_device_uninit() drops the device reference, and
for an unbound child that can run usbio_auxdev_release() and free the
containing struct usbio_client.
list_for_each_entry_reverse() advances after the loop body by reading
client->link.prev. If the current client is freed by
auxiliary_device_uninit(), the iterator dereferences freed memory.
Use list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse() so the previous client is
cached before the body can drop the final reference. This preserves
reverse teardown order while keeping the next iterator cursor independent
of the current client's lifetime.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x400
really_probe+0x316/0x660
__driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
__device_attach+0x133/0x2a0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70
bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0
device_add+0x9b9/0xc10
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? usb_enable_lpm+0x3c/0x260
usb_set_configuration+0xb64/0xf20
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x5f/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x71/0x1b0
really_probe+0x46b/0x660
__driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
__device_attach+0x133/0x2a0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70
bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0
device_add+0x9b9/0xc10
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? add_device_randomness+0xb7/0xf0
usb_new_device+0x492/0x870
hub_event+0x1b10/0x29c0
? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_acquire+0x187/0x300
? process_one_work+0x475/0xb90
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0
? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure
Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup
configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the
completion callback.
This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup
source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix MLE defragmentation
If either reconf or EPCS multi-link element (MLE) is contained in
a non-transmitted profile, the defragmentation routine is called
with a pointer to the defragmented copy, but the original elements.
This is incorrect for two reasons:
- if the original defragmentation was needed, it will not find the
correct data
- if the original frame is at a higher address, the parsing will
potentially overrun the heap data (though given the layout of
the buffers, only into the new defragmentation buffer, and then
it has to stop and fail once that's filled with copied data.
Fix it by tracking the container along with the pointer and in
doing so also unify the two almost identical defragmentation
routines. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit
The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h
explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers:
Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as
synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch.
[...]
Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible.
Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can
be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between
the calls.
xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before
freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid-
traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per
namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU
grace periods serially.
Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and
the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler;
xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables
after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees
between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch
instead of O(N).
Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)
at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread
both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct
net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed
to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and
__put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak. |
