| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown
ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing
the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs
file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed
monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.
Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients.
debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so
the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown. |
| Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows App-V Overlay Filter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Power BI Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()
The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).
The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.
However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.
Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.
Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block. |
| Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) |
| Remote Development Extension for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Quantum Development Kit for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Visual Studio Code ESLint Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows 10 Update Assistant Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: slip: serialize receive against buffer reallocation
sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding
sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff
without holding the lock.
An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink
can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an
out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old
rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.
Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock
while consuming each receive batch. |
